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THESES
1. The oil sector is the most important branch of the Russian economy. It sup-
plies the largest income to the state budget and is one of the main pillars on 
which Russia’s international position is based. Revenues from oil are also 
one of the chief means allowing the ruling class to maintain political and 
social stability in the country. The rapid growth in oil prices over the past 
few years (with the exception of the crisis in 2009) has brought about a vast 
increase in budget revenues and this has led to a strengthening of the Rus-
sian economy’s reliance on raw materials, to the government’s failure to 
carry out economic reforms and also to a stronger assertiveness in Russian 
foreign policy. However, the increasing dependence of the Russian state 
budget on high oil prices is harmful, because a continuing reduction in 
prices could bring about an economic crisis, which would have far-reach-
ing political consequences. 
2. The Russian oil sector’s greatest success in the past decade has been an in-
crease in oil production by more than 50%. This was possible due to the rap-
id increase in oil prices and extensive production at the oil fields most eas-
ily accessed. An effect of this is that many of them have been overexploited. 
This in combination with insufficient investment in geological work and 
the exploration of new deposits will bring about a reduction in production 
in the future.
3. Many problems have accumulated in the Russian oil sector and are posing 
serious challenges. The most serious include excessive fiscal levies which 
deprive firms of the funds necessary for investment, the monopolisation of 
the sector, the government’s discrimination in favour of state-controlled 
companies and significant restrictions imposed on foreign investors, who 
are treated mainly as technology suppliers. Without a liberalisation of the 
fiscal system, oil firms will not be able to generate capital for investment 
which is necessary for the exploration of new fields and the development 
of existing ones. The present problems are to a great extent a consequence 
of the government’s failure to adopt a well-thought-out and consistent pol-
icy and its treatment of the oil industry as a temporary source of budget 
revenues, which is preventing the development of this sector. 
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4. The Russian refinery sector is technologically outdated and requires a very 
costly and time-consuming modernisation. Over the past few years, the Rus-
sian government has been conducting an effective policy aimed at boosting 
the volumes of oil processed in Russian refineries; however the quality of 
their output is still low. At the same time, the Russian government is encour-
aging oil companies to invest more actively in takeovers of refineries and fuel 
distribution networks abroad, especially in EU member states.
5. Oil production is likely to increase slightly in Russia within the next two-
three years, and then it will start to fall below the level of 500 million 
tonnes. The degree of this fall will depend on the actions the government 
takes, including mainly the improvement of the fiscal environment and the 
investment climate. A change in the state fiscal policy will not stop the pro-
duction decline but it may significantly slow it down. However, if the gov-
ernment takes overly cautious and inconsistent actions, it cannot be ruled 
out that the level of production may even fall below 400 million tonnes in 
the medium term. 
6. The decline in Russian oil production will result in a reduction in its ex-
port levels, the volume of which will however depend on several factors, 
including the oil processing capacity of Russian refineries and domestic 
consumption. It cannot be ruled out that in connection with the increase 
of the customs duty rate on petroleum products in 2011, Russian oil exports 
will grow a little within the next three to four years above the present level 
of 244 million tonnes. However, in the longer term, it will be falling as oil 
production falls back. 
7. Despite the export diversification policy adopted by Russia, Europe will re-
main the key outlet for Russian oil in the foreseeable future, although its 
share will drop from the present level of 80% to around 65% of total exports 
within the next ten years. It is likely that Russian oil supplies to Europe 
will decrease by approximately 15-20% within the next few years, which 
will not however be the consequence of a political decision but rather of 
decreased output at Western Siberian oil fields, which are the main raw 
material base for Russian exports. 
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IntroductIon
Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance 
for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and ex-
ports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guaran-
tee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its 
international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy poten-
tial. One symbolic manifestation of this is the informal concept of Russia as 
an ‘energy empire’, which emerged several years ago. Oil corporations form 
a significant part of the Russian firms which are most active and recognisable 
on foreign markets. 
Paraphrasing the famous statement made by Tsar Alexander III in the late 19th 
century, that the Russian Empire had only two allies: its army and its fleet, 
one Russian expert concluded a few years ago that the Russian Federation also 
had only two allies: oil and gas1. While a great number of various publications 
have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research 
has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of 
the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater 
impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. 
The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Rus-
sian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the gov-
ernment’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be 
an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible fu-
ture production and the export levels of Russian oil, which is and will remain 
one of the major issues in Russia, and about the great impact on this country’s 
economy and politics. This topic is also important for EU member states, which 
are major importers of Russian oil. 
This study has been divided into five parts. The first one presents the signifi-
cance of the oil sector for the economy, political stability, and the international 
position of Russia. The second part shows the condition of the Russian oil de-
posits and provides a review and a brief characteristic of the present and pos-
sible future production centres. The third part describes the transport infra-
structure and the refinery sector. The fourth part analyses problems existing 
in this sector in detail, including: the inefficient fiscal system, discrimination 
1 D. Trenin, Reading Russia Right, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, 
October 2005, p. 6, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb42.trenin.FINAL.pdf
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in favour of state-controlled firms, and insufficient investments. This is espe-
cially important because the future of the sector will depend on the way these 
problems are resolved. The pivotal fifth part is an attempt to address the ques-
tion about possible oil production volumes in Russia until 2030 and future ex-
port levels, also broken down into the European and Asian directions. 
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I. crudE oIL – tHE FoundAtIon oF ruSSIA
1. oil as a source of income 
The oil industry is the most important sector of the Russian economy and 
a source of the largest share of state budget revenues. In 2010, profits from ex-
ports of oil and petroleum products accounted for 44% of all budget incomes2. 
This is a consequence of the rapid growth of oil prices on global markets, which 
has been observed over the past few years. The average price per Urals barrel, 
the main oil brand exported by Russia3, increased from US$11.8 in 1998 and 
US$23–27 in 2000–2003 to US$94.4 in 2008. This price fell in 2009 and 2010 to 
US$61.1 and US$78 respectively, to reach again a record-high level of US$109.4 
in 2011 (see Chart 1). 
Chart 1. Average annual Urals oil prices in 1999-2011
Data: EIA
Growing oil prices brought about a vast influx of petrodollars to the Rus-
sian state budget, one consequence of which is its deepening dependence on 
2 In the opinion of Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko http://www.rusenergy.com/ru/articles/
articles.php?id=49076
3 Russia also exports other oil brands, such as Siberian Light (from the Khanty-Mansi Au-
tonomous Okrug), ESPO (from Eastern Siberia) and Sokol and Vityaz (from Sakhalin).
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revenues from oil and petroleum product exports. These revenues were at 
a level of US$35–40 billion annually in 2000–2002, and started increasing rap-
idly in the next years to reach a record-high level of US$230 billion in 2008 
(see Chart 2). Although incomes from oil fell in the next two years as a result 
of lower oil prices, they reached an unprecedentedly high level in 2011 (US$263 
billion). It is worth emphasising that income generated by oil sales is much 
more vital for the Russian budget than the tax revenues from the gas sector, 
which accounts for 6–7% of total revenues.
Chart 2. Revenues from exports of oil and petroleum products in 2000–2011
Data: Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation
Since oil prices tripled over the past few years, the share of revenues from 
sales of oil and petroleum products in the total value of Russian exports also 
increased significantly. While in 2000–2003, this share ranged between 33.5% 
and 39.4%, for the last seven years it has been at a level of 48–53% (see Chart 3). 
Furthermore, Russia exports around 75% of the oil it produces (including 25% 
in a processed form as petroleum products), while only one third of Russian gas 
is exported. 
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Chart 3. The share of revenues from the export of oil and petroleum products 
in total Russian exports from 2000 to 2011
Data: Central Bank of the Russian Federation
2.  the significance of oil for political and economic stability 
Income generated by oil sales has been the basis for the stabilisation of the so-
cio-economic situation in Russia since 2000. This in turn is one of the key fac-
tors which add legitimacy to the governments of the country and ensure a high 
level of public support for the political elite led by Vladimir Putin. The increas-
ing oil prices enabled the Russian state to follow a path of relatively high eco-
nomic growth in the past few years (5–7% annually), which made it possible to 
significantly increase social expenditure and thus ‘extinguish’ potential out-
breaks of public unrest. According to the estimates of Russian economists, an 
increase in the oil price of 10% translates into 0.9% GDP growth at the most4. An 
increase (or decrease) in oil prices by US$2 per barrel automatically makes the 
state budget revenues go up (or down) by US$3 billion. Growing oil-generated 
income also made it possible for Moscow to repay its foreign debts ahead of 
schedule and annulled its need for international financial aid. Furthermore, 
part of the incomes from oil exports accumulated in the special Stabilisation 
Fund, which was created in 2004, enabled Russia to significantly alleviate 
4 ‘Po nayezzhennoi koleye’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 8, 2011, p. 20.
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the consequences of the financial crisis in 2008–20095. Russia’s oil potential 
is having a positive effect on the other sectors of the Russian economy and is 
becoming its driving force. However, since the population of Russia is much 
bigger than those of such oil producer countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar 
or Norway, the ‘oil rent’ is not able to ensure welfare to the Russian public as 
a whole6. This is also an effect of the fact that the oil industry employs only 3% 
of Russian workforce. 
However, the growing oil-generated revenues are having a number of nega-
tive consequences for Russia. The influx of petrodollars makes the ruble 
stronger against other currencies, in effect of which the production of other 
sectors of the economy (not based on raw materials) is less competitive in 
foreign markets. The worst consequence of expensive oil, however, is the fact 
that the Russian government has given up taking real action for modernisa-
tion and economic reforms. As the incomes from oil sales flow in generously, 
the Kremlin does not have to introduce any structural changes. Vladimir 
Putin’s discontinuation of reforms which had been launched during his first 
presidential tenure (2000–2004) coincided with the beginning of the in-
crease in the price of oil. 
It seems that at least part of the Russian political elite are aware of the nega-
tive impact expensive oil has on Russia. In his address to the Federal Assem-
bly, President Dmitry Medvedev admitted in 2009: “So long as oil prices were 
growing many, almost all of us, to be honest, fell for the illusion that structural 
reforms could wait and that what was important now was to make maximum 
use of the high prices. The priority was on pushing ahead the old raw materials 
economy, while developing unique technology and innovative products was the 
subject of only random individual decisions”7. In 2010, the Russian president 
stated in turn that high oil prices were an impediment to the modernisation of 
the country: “140 dollars per barrel would be a catastrophe; it would destroy 
all our incentives for development“8. Despite all this, the government has not 
taken any real action to change the raw material-based model of the Russian 
5 A. Dubas, J. Rogoża, I. Wiśniewska, ‘Russia in crisis: year one’ OSW Report, January 2010, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Crisis_report_2010.pdf, p. 13.
6 Income from exports of Russian oil and petroleum products in 2011 reached approximately 
US$1,800 per capita. 
7 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 12 November 2009, 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/297
8 Russia has no choice but to modernise its economy and social sphere, 28 May, 2010, http://
eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/285 
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economy, and the dependence of the Russian budget on oil prices is growing 
regularly stronger. While in 2000 the Russian budget ran no risk of a deficit 
with the oil price at US$25–30 per barrel, in 2008 this level rose to US$70, and 
the budget for 2011 envisaged the lack of a deficit if the oil price is not below 
US$105. Since the market situation for oil producers was good, Russia was able 
to balance its budget in 2011 (the budget surplus reached 0.8% of GDP). 
The increasing dependence of the Russian budget on oil-generated incomes 
and its sensitivity to price changes has brought about a situation wherein 
maintaining the oil price at a high level has nearly become a raison d’État in 
Russia. This is so because the government’s ability to fulfil its obligations to the 
increasingly developed social sector, and thus to maintaining social stability, 
depends on that. In connection with the parliamentary (December 2011) and 
presidential (March 2012) elections, social expenses have been increased fur-
ther. As a consequence, the budget law for 2012 envisages a deficit of 1.5% of GDP 
on the assumption that the average oil price will be US$1009. Analysts estimate 
that public finances could be balanced only at a level of US$117 per barrel. 
The heavy reliance of the Russian budget and economy on high oil prices is 
potentially posing a threat to Russia’s financial stability. According to esti-
mates by the Russian government’s experts, a price fall to US$80 would lead 
to a reduction in economic growth of 2.5% of GDP and a significant decrease in 
investments10. Should the oil price fall to US$60, Russia’s GDP would shrink by 
1.4% and investments by 6.5%. In turn the Public Debt Management Policy to 
2014 prepared by the Ministry of Finance speculates that should the oil price 
fall to US$60 per barrel, i.e. the level it was at in 2006–2007, the budget deficit 
will reach 5% of GDP, and if the price fell below US$50, the deficit could grow 
by as much as 20% of GDP11. In effect, a potential decrease in the oil price could 
lead to a serious economic crisis in Russia, which would certainly have an im-
mense impact on Russian politics. Since the government is treating the oil sec-
tor as a cash cow, the fiscal levies are among the highest among oil producer 
countries. Despite appeals from oil corporations and warnings of the negative 
consequences of the defective tax system, which have been repeated for many 
years, Russian politicians are reluctant to consider proposals to cut taxes. 
9 The budget law also estimates that the oil price will reach US$97 in 2013 and US$101 in 2014.
10 ‘Yest’ li zhizn nizhe $100/barriel’? Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 22/2011. 
11 Y. Kravchenko, M. Lutova, ‘Pechal neftianika’ Vedomosti, 11 August 2011.
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3. oil as foreign policy instrument
The country’s energy potential has been used by the government to reinforce 
Russia’s position on the international arena. Practical experiences over the past 
few years prove that growing budget revenues from oil exports have stimulat-
ed an increase in Russia’s international ambitions and have made Russian for-
eign policy more assertive12. At the end of Vladimir Putin’s first term in office as 
president (2000–2004), when oil prices started growing rapidly, the informal 
concept of Russia as an ‘energy empire’ was forged. It has not been formalised 
in any official document or speech by a representative of the Russian govern-
ment. It should be seen as an attempt by experts to define Moscow’s political 
actions aimed at helping it to build its international position on the basis of the 
country’s unique oil and gas potential13. However, symptoms of thinking about 
Russian in terms of an ‘energy empire’ have appeared in some official Russian 
documents. The Energy Strategy to 2020, which was adopted in August 2003, 
includes a statement which admits the significance of the energy policy as 
a foreign policy tool: “Russia possesses great energy resources and a power-
ful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis of economic development and 
the instrument of leading internal and external policy. The role the country 
is playing on global energy markets to a great extent defines its geopolitical 
influence”14. In turn, President Vladimir Putin said at a session of the Security 
Council in 2005 that “Russia wants to be a global energy leader”15. This simi-
lar belief results from the fact that, apart from its energy sector, Russia has 
relatively low economic potential which may be used as a tool to strengthen its 
international status and economic presence abroad. 
In effect, oil and gas are often used by Russia as a bargaining chip in relations 
with other countries, and Russian oil companies are the most important Rus-
sian foreign investors and often invest in sectors of strategic significance. 
Moscow supports their foreign expansions, seeing them – especially in CIS 
countries and the former Eastern Bloc – as one of its key foreign policy tools. 
12 Interestingly, the Russian-Georgian war broke out at the time when global oil prices had 
reached the highest levels in history. Oil cost US$147 per barrel in July 2008, three weeks 
before the start of the conflict. 
13 See, for example, F. Hill, Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia’s Revival, Foreign Policy Cen-
tre, September 2004, http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/307.pdf
14 Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda, p. 4. However, the new version 
of the Energy Strategy to 2030, which was adopted at the end of 2009, does not contain such 
a statement. 
15 http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/12/99294.shtml
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Examples of how Russia uses oil issues to apply political pressure include: cut-
ting oil supplies to the Ventspils terminal in 2001 after the Latvian government 
had refused to sell it to a Russian company; switching off the pipeline which 
supplied oil to Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery in 2006 (under the pretext of its 
‘failure’) after the decision had been announced that it would be sold to Po-
land’s PKN Orlen instead of to a Russian corporation16; and the withholding of 
oil exports to Belarus in 2007 to force Minsk to accept new conditions of raw 
material imports. Furthermore, Russia often combines signing a contract for 
oil or gas supplies with certain concessions to a given Russian firm. For exam-
ple, one of the conditions of the Russian-Chinese agreement on the construc-
tion of the oil pipeline running from Eastern Siberia to China was the granting 
of 49% of the shares in the Tianjin refinery under construction to Rosneft, ow-
ing to which this Russian firm entered the Chinese market for the first time. 
The strategy for strengthening the international position of Russian oil corpo-
rations by restricting the access foreign companies have to the Russian energy 
sector has been evident since 2010. State-controlled firms are aiming at taking 
over shares in a given Western firm or in its production assets or at technology 
transfer in exchange for minority stakes in oil fields in Russia. This is especial-
ly clear in the case of the Arctic, the world’s largest undeveloped region which 
potentially has vast deposits of oil and gas. Pursuant to Russian law, licenc-
es for field exploration in the Arctic can be obtained only by state-controlled 
firms (Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Gazprom and Zarubezhneft), which may then 
offer minority stakes on certain conditions to a foreign company. The most 
vivid example of this new policy is the deal Rosneft and ExxonMobil struck 
in August 2011, in effect of which Rosneft has gained access to ExxonMobil’s 
six production units, including in the USA and Canada, in exchange for 33% 
of the shares in three fields on the Kara Sea. In January 2011, Rosneft made an 
attempt to strike an even more beneficial deal with BP, which would offer the 
Russian company 5% of the shares in the British company in exchange for 10% 
of its own shares. However, this agreement was not implemented. 
16 Russia also cut supplies in 2000, when the Mazeikiai refinery was purchased by the US-
based Williams, which in effect led to this firm being resold to Russia’s Yukos.
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II. ruSSIAn oIL dEPoSItS
1. deposit levels
Russia has oil deposits which are among the largest in the world (7th place) and 
is the world’s largest oil producer (12.9% share in global output in 2010)17. Ac-
cording to international estimates (for example, from the BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy and the EIA), confirmed Russian oil deposits are at a level of 
around 10 billion tonnes, which accounts for 5.6% of global deposits. Thus, with 
the present production level (511.3 million tonnes in 2011), they would be suf-
ficient for twenty years. Russian data are much more optimistic. The Russian 
Energy Ministry estimates that the volume of the oil fields fit for production is 
at least 22 billion tonnes, which would allow it to maintain its present output 
level for approximately forty years. Furthermore, Russia estimates that its oil 
deposits on the continental shelf, mainly in the Arctic, could reach 16.5 billion 
tonnes and that it is very likely that new significant deposits will be found. 
A characteristic feature of the Russian oil sector is that most of its oil origi-
nates from large fields, which currently account for approximately 60% of total 
output. However, the problem is that they have been depleted significantly, by 
60%. Another feature of the Russian oil production sector is the 60% share of 
fields which are difficult to access in the total production level of the largest oil 
companies. Moreover, a vast majority of the fields were put into operation in 
Soviet times, while new, recently launched projects account for only slightly 
more than ten percent of annual output (see Chart 5). Additionally, most of 
them have been classified as small or medium due to their complex geological 
structure and require further expensive investment. 
Russian oil deposits were regularly depleting between 1991 and 2004 as more 
oil was being produced than found in new fields. This was an effect of the over-
exploitation of the fields by some of the companies and a significant decrease 
in investment outlays on geological and exploration work. It is only since 2005 
that the deposits in the newly found oil fields have been higher than the annual 
output in Russia. However, most of the new fields are classified as small, and 
their development is less cost-efficient than is the case with medium and large 
fields. Furthermore, the increase in the deposits also results from the fact that 
17 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, London 2011. In 2010, Russia produced 37 mil-
lion tonnes of oil more than Saudi Arabia. Also in 2011 Russia was the biggest world’s oil of 
producer.
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the previously discovered oil fields were classified in higher categories deter-
mining the likelihood of production. In aggregate, between 2000 and 2010, the 
surplus of newly discovered oil deposits above output at that time reached 89 
million tonnes.
2. Key production centres
Russia has several oil production centres (called oil provinces), two of which are 
of key significance: Western Siberia and the Volga-Ural region; these account 
respectively for 63% and 22.1% of Russian oil production. The regions of lesser, if 
growing, significance are: Timan-Pechora (6.3%), which is located in the north 
of the European part of the country, the Far East (2.9%), Eastern Siberia with 
the northern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai (3.9%) and the Northern Caucasus (1.8%). 
The location of Russian oil provinces is shown on the map 1 (see page 19), while 
Table 1 presents the shares of each Russian region in oil production. 
Table 1. The shares of Russian regions in oil production (2010)
region millions of tonnes %
Western Siberia 318.3 63
Volga-Ural 111.5 22.1
Timan-Pechora 31.5 6.3
Eastern Siberia and northern  
Krasnoyarsk Krai
19.7 3.9
Far East 14.8 2.9
Northern Caucasus 9.3 1.8
TOTAL 505.1 100
Western Siberia, which encompasses the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug 
(82% of regional output), the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (12.5%) and 
the Tyumen, Tomsk and Novosibirsk Oblasts (5.5%), is Russia’s most important 
oil region and one of the world’s largest oil production centres. In 2010, the to-
tal output of the Western Siberian oil province reached 318.3 million tonnes. 
Oil from this region is characterised by its high quality owing to a low sulphur 
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content (Siberian Light brand), and the fields have a good geological structure. 
Despite continuous production since 1964, this region still has around half of 
Russia’s oil deposits, including eight of the ten largest oil fields in Russia. Two 
of these, the Priobskoye field (it is owned by Rosneft and Gazprom Neft and 
produces 34 million tonnes of oil annually) and the Samotlor field (owned by 
TNK-BP, 25 million tonnes), are among the world’s ten largest oil fields and in 
aggregate account for 15% of Russia’s oil production. However, the most serious 
problem the Western Siberian oil province has is the high level of depletion of 
its fields, reaching approximately 50%, as a consequence of which their output 
is regularly falling (in the case of the Samotlor field by around 5% annually). 
The output is declining despite increasing investment activity. Most Russian 
experts believe that it is no longer possible to increase output in Western Si-
beria, and the most optimistic scenario is to maintain it at the present level18.
Before large-scale oil production commenced in Western Siberia, the most im-
portant Soviet oil province was Volga-ural, which encompasses Tatarstan, 
Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Perm Krai and the Samara and Orenburg Oblasts. Since 
the beginning of the operation of the fields in this province in the 1920s, over 
6 billion tonnes of oil have been produced, including 111.5 million tonnes in 
2010. Oil from this region is heavy and contains a high level of sulphur, and 
therefore is sold at lower prices than Brent and various other brands of Rus-
sian oil. The fields in this region have been depleted by 70%, and the output is 
regularly decreasing. Oil deposits in the Volga-Ural region still account for 16% 
of total Russian oil deposits. The largest field in the region and the one with the 
third largest production capacity in Russia (15 million tonnes annually) is the 
Romashkino field owned by Tatneft, which has however been depleted by 80%.
The third largest Russian oil province in terms of output is timan-Pechora, 
which is located in the north of the European part of Russia and encompasses 
the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Komi Republic. A total of 31.5 million 
tonnes of oil was produced there in 2010, which accounted for 6.3% of total Rus-
sian oil production (58.5% was produced in the Komi Republic and 41.5% in the 
Nenets AO). Small scale oil production began in Timan-Pechora already as far 
back as the 1930s. It was only in the 1960s when large-scale production com-
menced in this region. At the same time, development of the fields in its north-
ern part began and production was launched here in the 1990s. The estimated 
deposits of Timan-Pechora are 1.3 billion tonnes, which accounts for 6% of all 
18 See, for example: M. Turukalov, ‘Zapadnaya Sibir: ot snizheniya dobychi do obvala’ Neftega-
zovaya Vertikal, no. 6, 2009, p. 14.
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oil deposits in Russia. The fields in this region are still at the initial stage of 
exploitation (10%). The output has been decreasing over the past two years, but 
it is expected to increase from 2015, when production starts in several larger 
fields (including the Trebsa and Titova fields). Most fields in this region are 
classified as small and medium, and 70% of them are difficult to access and cap-
ital-intensive. Oil from this region has a higher quality than the sulphated oil 
from Volga-Ural, and therefore is sold at higher prices. It (Arctic Light brand) is 
exported from the Varandey terminal by the Barents Sea. The level of geologi-
cal and exploration work in Timan-Pechora is among the highest in all Russian 
oil provinces. 
The oldest Russian oil region is the northern caucasus. The beginnings of oil 
production there date back to the late 19th century. However, the fields in this 
region, which are located in Chechnya, Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai, are 
almost totally depleted and have a marginal share in total Russian oil produc-
tion (annual output there is approximately 5 million tonnes).
3. Future oil regions
As production levels in the traditional oil fields are regularly falling, the de-
velopment of new regions is a problem. Eastern Siberia with the northern part 
of Krasnoyarsk Krai and the Far East (and the Arctic shelf in the longer term) 
stand the greatest chance of becoming major production sources. Production 
has already started in some of these regions, although its level is still low. An 
increase in output is also expected on the Caspian and the Black Sea continen-
tal shelves, which will however have less impact on the Russian oil sector. 
What these regions have in common is that they all have been explored geolog-
ically to only a small extent so far, which makes it difficult to assess the volume 
of the oil deposits there. Furthermore, investments in geological and explora-
tion research are at low levels, the discovered fields are at the initial stage of 
development and most of them are classified as medium in terms of confirmed 
deposits. What makes Eastern Siberia, the Far East and the Arctic shelf differ-
ent from the present chief production centres are the much harsher climate 
conditions; this significantly raises the costs of investment and requires the 
application of new, often still undeveloped technologies (as in the case of the 
Arctic shelf). Another crucial aspect regarding the new fields is the feasibil-
ity of production, while in 80% of them production is unprofitable, given the 
present fiscal situation. 
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As regards the future oil regions, the Far East was the first where oil produc-
tion started. Currently, oil is produced only in the fields on the Sakhalin shelf, 
which were discovered in the 1980s and were gradually put into operation over 
the past ten years. The confirmed oil deposits of the Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2 and 
Sakhalin-3 projects are approximately 400 million tonnes. Forecasted depos-
its in this region are many times higher and are estimated to reach 1.5 billion 
tonnes. In 2010, the level of oil output in the Far East was 14.8 million tonnes, 
i.e. 2.9% of total Russian output. In addition to the deposits in Sakhalin, explo-
ration work is taking place on the shelves of Kamchatka and Chukotka, which 
are seen as future oil regions. 
Production also commenced in Eastern Siberia after the launch of the ESPO 
(Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean) oil pipeline in 2010. This region previously had 
no transport infrastructure whatsoever, which prevented the development 
of its oil fields. The Russian government is planning to make Eastern Siberia 
a key Russian oil production centre within the next twenty years. According 
to current estimates, Eastern Siberia has 1.15 billion tonnes of confirmed and 
1.18 billion tonnes of probable oil deposits19. This oil is of much better quality 
and contains less sulphur than the oil from the Volga-Ural region and this will 
translate into high demand for this commodity on Asian markets. According 
to Russian geologists, new deposits are likely to be found in this region. The 
Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences even estimates that ex-
ploitable oil reserves in Eastern Siberia and the Far East could reach a gigantic 
volume of between 15 and 22 billion tonnes, although this figure is often re-
duced to 8 billion tonnes20. The insignificant increase in the deposits in the past 
few years has not confirmed these highly optimistic forecasts as yet, which is 
also due to the insufficient intensity of geological and exploration research in 
the region. 
The northern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai is often mentioned as Eastern Sibe-
ria although geographically it is part of Western Siberia. Oil production there 
started in 2009 and is currently in place only at the Vankor field, the largest 
oil field to have been developed in Russia from the very beginning after 1991. 
Vankor has 390 million tonnes of proven oil reserves and 105 million tonnes 
19 O. Prishchepa, Y. Podolsky, ‘Mneniye VNIGRI: net po nefti i vozmozhno po gazu’ Neftega-
zovaya Vertikal, no. 20, 2010, p. 28.
20 N. Pusenkowa, ‘Vostok yest vostok: novaya neftegazovaya provintsiya Rossii’, Rabochiye 
materialy moskovskogo Centra Carnegie, no. 4, 2007, p. 14.
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of likely reserves21. In 2010, the total output in Eastern Siberia and the north-
ern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai reached 19.7 million tonnes, which accounted for 
3.9% of Russian oil production in aggregate. The output will continue to grow 
rapidly in the immediate future, but its ultimate level is still disputable. In-
creasing production in this region has already partly compensated for the still 
relatively low decline in Western Siberian production. 
Another future oil production region is the Arctic shelf, and primarily the 
Kara, the Barents and the Pechora Seas. However, given the extreme climate 
conditions, the technological needs and the enormous costs, production in this 
region is still seen as a distant future project. It is unlikely to be launched be-
fore 2030. Only three licences for production at the Kara Sea have been granted 
so far (to Rosneft). According to forecasts from the Russian Ministry for the 
Natural Environment, exploitable oil reserves on the Arctic shelf could reach 
11.5 billion tonnes22. However, these estimates are not based on any geological 
survey since this region is still almost totally unexplored. 
According to official Russian estimates, considerable oil deposits could also be 
found in the other parts of the Russian continental shelf. In addition to the 
shelf in the Far East already mentioned, the Russian parts of the caspian and 
Black Sea shelves are promising regions. LUKoil embarked on oil exploration 
on the Caspian shelf in 1995 and has found several significant oil fields, with re-
serves of approximately 300 million tonnes. In 2010 production commenced in 
the Korchagin oil field near Astrakhan, the first one in this region of Russia23. 
The sea shelf in Dagestan also seems promising, but no geological work is be-
ing conducted there for the time being. Meanwhile, exploration work has been 
launched on the Black Sea shelf. The work is most advanced on two fields: the 
Tuapse Trough and the Shatsky Ridge (both are owned by Rosneft). Their esti-
mated oil deposits are approximately 1.2 billion tonnes and approximately 860 
million tonnes respectively24. Production in this region, despite favourable cli-
mate conditions, will be capital-intensive and will not start before 2025. Small 
amounts of oil (hundreds of thousands of tonnes annually) are also produced 
on the continental shelf in Kaliningrad Oblast. 
21 http://rosneft.ru/Upstream/ProductionAndDevelopment/eastern_siberia/vankorneft/
22 http://www.ngv.ru/about/news/news9528.aspx
23 http://lukoil.ru/materials/images/Oil_production/2011/Oil_production_FB_ru.pdf
24 Y. Mazneva, V. Novyi, ‘Morskoy rekord’ Vedomosti, 18 June 2010.
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4. the level of oil production
Oil production in Russia grew from 323 million tonnes in 2000 to 511.3 million 
tonnes in 2011 (see Chart 4). Against this, approx. 90% of oil (464 million tonnes) 
is produced by the nine largest corporations25. This increase of as much as 58% 
over this period is the Russian oil sector’s greatest success and its impact on 
Russia’s economy and politics cannot easily be overstated. The giant leap in 
production was to a great extent unexpected. The Ministry of Energy forecast-
ed in 2000 that the output within the next few years would grow marginally 
at the best and at the same time did not rule out that it could fall significantly. 
There are two major reasons which provide the explanation as to why the pro-
duction level has risen so much in the Russian oil sector. Firstly, the private 
owners of the corporations adopted a policy of extensive production, almost 
overexploitation, and focused on the most easily accessible fields which had 
been developed already in Soviet times26. Their goal was to maximise profits by 
producing the largest amount of oil possible at the lowest possible cost, without 
considering the rationality or future consequences of such methods. In effect, 
many of the most cost-effective oil fields have been overexploited. State insti-
tutions, which were weak at that time, were unable to hold this back. Second-
ly, the increase in production was stimulated by the fact that oil prices grew 
several times within one decade, as has been mentioned above. All this led to 
a revival of the oil sector, which was in a deep crisis in the 1990s. The influx of 
capital and the resulting introduction of new technologies which enabled an 
intensification of production made it possible to resume production in fields 
which had been considered unprofitable. 
25 According to data for 2011: Rosneft (122 million tonnes), LUKoil (90.7 million), TNK-BP (86 
mil lion), Surgutneftegaz (60.7 million), Gazprom Neft (32 million), Tatneft (26 million), 
Slavneft (18 million), Bashneft (14 million) and Russneft (13 million). The remaining 10% of 
the oil was produced by Gazprom, international consortiums operating in the Sakhalin-1 
and Sakhalin-2 fields, and small oil firms, including three major ones: Tomskneft, Salym 
Petroleum and Novatek.
26 ‘Neftedobycha: shatkoye blagopoluchiye’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010.
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Chart 4. Oil production in Russia 1999–2011
Data: Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation
However, the production growth rate, which in 2000–2004 ranged between 
6% and 11% annually, started slowing down to reach around 2% in the past few 
years. 2008 was an exception, because the production level went down a little. 
This means that the sources of the growth are running low, which is primarily 
a consequence of the regular decrease in the output of the old fields, which are 
of key significance for this sector. Nevertheless, over the past few years this 
decrease was compensated by growing production levels in new fields, espe-
cially in Eastern Siberia (the Vankor, Verkhnechonsk and Talakan fields) and 
in Sakhalin. In 2009, the output of the fields which had been put into operation 
within the five preceding years reached 31 million tonnes, which accounted for 
6.7% of total oil production (see Chart 5). 
The insufficient level of investment in geological and exploration work and the 
development of the fields which have already been discovered are to a great 
extent a consequence of excessive fiscal burdens imposed on oil companies and 
this is adversely affecting the condition of the Russian oil sector. The increas-
ing monopolisation and restricted access for foreign investments are also hav-
ing a detrimental effect on this sector. The most serious problems of the Rus-
sian oil sector are presented extensively in Chapter IV. 
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Chart 5. Share in percent of new fields in the total output of oil companies in 2009
Data: Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 4, 2010
5. the level of oil exports
Russia is the world’s second largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia, with 
a share of 13.2% in 201027. Oil exports are the main source of incme for Russian 
oil companies and the state budget alike. The export volume increased by ap-
proximately 75% over the past ten years, from 145 million tonnes in 2000 to 247 
million tonnes in 2011 (see Chart 6). This was an effect of a significant output 
growth. Since 2004, export volume has been maintained at approximately 250 
million tonnes annually. At the same time, exports of petroleum products have 
become significantly higher, as well; since 2004, their level has risen from 50 
million tonnes to 132 million tonnes (for more information see Chapter III, sec-
tion 3.2.).
Around 87% of Russian oil is exported by pipelines, which are controlled by 
Transneft, and 13% of the exports are transported by railway and river ships. 
According to data for 2009, the key outlets for Russian oil exports are EU mem-
ber states and the Balkans, which buy 70% of exported Russian oil. CIS coun-
tries (mainly Belarus and Ukraine) have a share of 21%, Asia 12%, North and 
27 Saudi Arabia’s share is 15.4%. Iran, with a share of 5.4%, is ranked third. Data from the EIA 
for 2010.
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Wykres 5. Procentowy udział nowych złóż w ogólnym poziomie wydobycia 
koncernów naftowych w 2009 roku
Dane: Nieftiegazowaja Wiertikal, nr 4, 2010
5. Poziom eksportu ropy
Rosja jest drugim największym po Arabii Saudyjskiej eksporterem ropy na 
świecie, z udziałem w wysokości 13,2%27. Eksport ropy jest podstawowym 
źródłem dochodów zarówno rosyjskich konc rnów naftowych, jak i budżetu 
państwa. Eksport surowca wzrósł w ciągu ostatnich dziesięciu lat o około 75%, 
z poziomu 145 mln t n w 2000 roku do 250 mln ton w 2010 r ku (zob. Wykres 6), 
co wynikało ze znaczącego wzrostu wydobyc a. Od 20 4 roku wielkość eks-
portu utrzymuje się na poziomie około 250 mln ton rocznie. Jedn cześnie jed-
nak znacznie zwiększył się eksport produktów naftowych, który od 2004 roku 
wzrósł o 50 mln ton do 132 mln ton (zob. szerzej rozdz. III, pkt 3.2.).
Około 87% rosyjskiej ropy eksportowane jest za pośrednictwem ropociągów 
znajdujących się pod kontrolą Transniefti, a 13% przypada na transport kolejo-
wy i rzeczny. Według danych za 2009 rok głównym rynkiem eksportu rosyj-
skiej ropy są państwa UE i Bałkanów, na które przypada 70% całości sprzedaży. 
Udział krajów obszaru WNP wynosi 21% (głównie Białoruś i Ukraina), Azji 12%, 
27 Udział Arabii Saudyjskiej wynosi 15,4%, na trzecim miejscu jest Iran – 5,4%. Dane EIA za 
2010 rok.
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5. Poziom eksportu ropy
Rosja jest drugim naj ększym po Arabii Saudyjskiej eksporterem ropy na 
świecie, z udziałem w wysokości 13,2%27. Eksp rt ropy jest podstawowym 
źródłem dochodów zarówno rosyjskich koncernów naftowych, jak i budżetu 
państwa. Eksport surowca wzrósł w ciągu ostatnich dziesięciu lat o około 75%, 
z poziomu 145 mln ton w 2000 roku do 250 mln to   2010 roku (zob. Wykres 6), 
co wynikało ze znaczącego wzrost  wydobycia. Od 2004 roku wielk ść eks-
portu utrzymuje się na poziomie około 250 mln ton rocznie. Jednocześnie jed-
nak znacznie zwiększył się eksport produktów naftowych, który od 2004 roku 
wzrósł o 50 mln ton do 132 mln ton (zob. szerzej rozdz. III, pkt 3.2.).
Około 87% rosyjskiej ropy eksportowane jest za pośred ictwem ropociągów 
znajdujących się pod kontrolą Transniefti, a 13% przypada na transport kolejo-
wy i rzeczny. Według danych za 2009 rok głównym rynkiem ekspo tu rosyj-
skiej ropy są państwa UE  Bałkanów, na które przypada 70% całości sprzedaży. 
Udział krajów obszaru WNP wynosi 21% (głównie Białoruś i Ukraina), Azji 12%, 
27 Udział Arabii Saudyjskiej wynosi 15,4%, na trzecim miejscu jest Iran – 5,4%. Dane EIA za 
2010 rok.
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South Americas 6%, Africa 0.7% and Australia 0.3%28. The largest importers of 
Russian oil are: Germany (10% of total oil exports), Holland (7.5%), Poland (5.5%) 
and China (5%).
Chart 6. Russian oil exports from 1999 to 2011
Data: Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation
28 Data from the EIA.
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III. trAnSPort InFrAStructurE And tHE rEFInErY 
SEctor 
1. Existing infrastructure
Russia has one of the world’s largest oil pipeline networks, with a total length of 
68,000 km, including 19,300 km of product oil pipelines. The exclusive owner 
of the oil pipelines is the state-controlled company Transneft, which also holds 
a monopoly on oil transport. This company manages access to pipelines and al-
locates quotas to oil companies for oil transport within Russia and for export. 
In aggregate, Transneft is in charge of the transport of 93% of Russian oil. The 
rest is transported mainly by the Russian Railways (RZhD) and private firms. 
The key Russian oil pipeline mains (see Map 2) run from Western Siberia and 
the Urals to the central part of Russia, and from there to the Russian export 
terminals in Novorossiysk and Tuapse by the Black Sea (the Samara–Novo-
rossiysk oil pipeline) and to Primorsk (the Baltic Pipeline System, BPS, oil pipe-
line). The new Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO), the first section of which 
was put into operation in 2010, is gaining significance. Other important oil ex-
port centres are the oil terminals Varandey by the Barents Sea, which handles 
oil from Timan-Pechora, and De Kastri in Khabarovsk Krai, which transports 
part of the oil from Sakhalin. In aggregate, approximately 60% of Russian oil 
(around 150 million tonnes annually) is exported by sea. 
The key export pipelines are: Druzhba, the northern branch of which supplies 
oil to Belarus, Poland and Germany, and the southern branch to Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (in total around 75 million tonnes annually), and 
the Skovorodino–Daqing oil pipeline (a branch of ESPO), which was put into 
operation in January 2011 and carries oil to China. This new oil export route 
has an annual capacity of 15 million tonnes, which can be expanded to 30 mil-
lion tonnes. This is also the first energy infrastructure connection between 
Russia and China. The Samara–Odessa oil pipeline, which supplied oil to part 
of Ukrainian refineries, was also in use until 2009.
2. Infrastructure under construction
Over the past five years Russia has been intensively developing its new 
transport infrastructure, for both internal use and export. The largest pro-
jects as part of the development of the national networks are the pipelines: 
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Zapolyarnoye–Purpe and Purpe–Samotlor (approximately 910 km in length; 
capacity of 25 million tonnes by 2013 to increase to 50 million tonnes by 2016; 
the project is worth over US$5 billion), which will carry oil from the north-
ern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai29, and Tikhoretsk–Tuapse-2 (247 km long, 12 mil-
lion tonnes of oil annually, cost of US$0.7 billion), which is aimed at increas-
ing oil supplies to the Tuapse refinery. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) 
oil pipeline also runs through the southern part of Russia. CPC is used for the 
transit of Kazakh oil, and its capacity will be expanded from 28 million tonnes 
to 67 million tonnes annually by 2015. Two key export oil pipelines under con-
struction are ESPO and BPS-2 (Baltic Pipeline System-2).
the ESPo oil pipeline is among the most strategic and expensive projects 
being implemented currently in the Russian energy sector. Its purpose is to 
contribute to the emergence of a new oil production centre in Eastern Siberia 
and to connect the oil fields there with the Kozmino terminal by the Pacific 
Ocean. The new oil pipeline is also expected to help diversify Russian oil ex-
ports through entry to the Asian oil markets. The construction of ESPO com-
menced in 2006. The first part of the pipeline (Tayshet–Skovorodino), which 
is 2,700 km long and has a capacity of 30 million tonnes, was launched in Jan-
uary 2010. At present, oil is transported by railway from Skovorodino to the 
Kozmino terminal. In the second phase of the project (by 2013) the oil pipeline 
to Kozmino will be built (50 million tonnes, 1,763 km long) and the capacity of 
the first part will be expanded to 80 million tonnes. The total cost of ESPO con-
struction will exceed US$30 billion30. 
The construction of the BPS-2 oil pipeline, which will connect Unecha (Bry-
ansk oblast) and Ust-Luga by the Baltic Sea (998 km long), started in mid 2009. 
The new pipeline will be built in two stages. The first branch, which will have 
an annual capacity of 30 million tonnes of oil, will be put into operation in the 
first quarter of 2012. Then the pipeline’s capacity will be expanded to 50 million 
tonnes by the end of 2013. The total cost of the project will reach US$5 billion31. 
29 The Purpe–Samotlor oil pipeline was put into operation in October 2011.
30 For more on ESPO see: W. Konończuk, ‘Russia launches its oil pipeline to Asia’ EastWeek, 6 Jan-
uary 2010, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/EastWeek_194.pdf; W. Konończuk, 
‘The East Siberia/Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline: a strategic project – organisational fail-
ure?’ OSW Commentary, no. 12, 2008, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2008-10-22/east-siberiapacific-ocean-espo-oil-pipeline-strategic-project-o
31 For more on BPS-2 see: W. Konończuk, ‘The construction of the BPS-2 oil pipeline starts’ 
EastWeek, 17 June 2009, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2009-06-17/con-
struction-bps-2-oil-pipeline-starts
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The construction of the BPS-2 oil pipeline is not economically viable since the 
Russian oil pipeline infrastructure already has a larger export capacity than 
needed. Thus the aim of this project is not really to increase the volume of oil 
transported but rather to gain an oil export route alternative to the Druzhba 
oil pipeline and to minimise dependence on transit states. This will enable 
Russia to manoeuvre its transport routes to Europe and will provide it with 
a means to apply pressure on the transit states (Belarus, Ukraine and Poland) 
and oil recipients in Central Europe. 
When the new oil pipelines, BPS-2 and ESPO, with a planned total annual ca-
pacity of 120 million tonnes, have been completed, Russia will be able to ex-
port approximately 45% more oil. The construction of both routes is at an ad-
vanced stage (one section of BPS-2 has already been put into operation), and 
the Russian government is clearly determined to carry through the construc-
tion. Money will also not be a problem, since Transneft has been given in 2009 
a loan from China for the construction of ESPO (US$10 billion) and is receiving 
support from the state. Therefore, it may be expected that these two strategic 
oil pipelines will be completed as planned.
3. the refinery sector
Although Russia is a global leader in oil production, its refinery sector is tech-
nologically outdated and needs a very expensive modernisation. The annual 
processing capacity of Russian refineries is 279 million tonnes, which accounts 
for 6.2% of global refinery output, and ensures Russia third place after the USA 
and China32. However, Russian refineries are not running at full capacity: the 
volume of oil processed in 2011 reached 258 million tonnes, of which 132 million 
tonnes was exported. 
28 refineries are operating at present in Russia. In aggregate, they generate 96% 
of the total oil refining output (the remaining part is generated by Gazprom’s 
chemical plants and ‘mini-refineries’). Most of these firms are owned by a few 
of Russia’s largest oil corporations, which control 72% of total output33. All 
these refineries, with the exception of two, were built before the mid 1960s 
and, with a few exceptions, have not been modernised since. The systems in-
stalled in them have been worn down to a level of 80%, and the average level of 
32 BP Statistical Review..., op. cit.
33 Including 50 million tonnes by Rosneft, 45 million by LUKoil, 22 million by TNK-BP, 22 mil-
lion by Surgutneftegaz and 18 million by Gazprom Neft.
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oil processing depth is as low as 71.2%, while a significant part of the refineries 
has a level of around only 60% (this level in the EU is around 90%)34. The Nel-
son Index reflects the degree of oil refining complexity and the possibility to 
manufacture highly-processed petroleum products and in the case of Russian 
refineries this is only 4.4. For comparison, this index reaches 7.4 in Western 
Europe, 9.5 in the Płock refinery owned by PKN Orlen, almost 10 in the Lotos 
refinery in Gdańsk, and 10.3 in the Mazeikiai refinery in Lithuania35. Due to 
technological backwardness, Russian refineries manufacture mainly low-pro-
cessed products. Their production structure in 2011 was as follows: heavy fuel 
oil (mazut, 23.5%), diesel oil (31.7%), petrol (16.4%), aviation fuel (4.1%), other 
products (12.8%) and has remained basically unchanged since the 1990s.
3.1. The government’s policy towards the sector
The Russian government’s policy towards the oil sector over the past few years 
has been aimed at increasing the level of processing at Russian refineries and 
thus exporting more petroleum products at the expense of crude oil. Already 
in 1999, the government introduced a rule that access to Transneft’s export 
system will be provided on condition that oil supply quotas to refineries have 
been met. In effect of this decision and also because of the rise in the prices of 
petroleum products in global markets, the level of usage of the capacity of Rus-
sian refineries has grown from 70% in 2000 to 90% at present (see Chart 7). The 
Energy Strategy to 2030 envisages a further increase in oil processing volumes 
to 249–260 million tonnes in 2022 and 275–311 million tonnes in 2030.
The government is also intending to force the refinery industry to embark 
on modernisation. In recent years, refinery owners have made relatively low 
investments primarily due to the lack of modernisation stimuli, including in 
the form of tax breaks. The policy recently adopted by the Kremlin is aimed at 
forcing refineries to make a technological leap by administrative means. One 
of these means is the ban on the production of fuels of Euro-2 class, which has 
been in force since 2011, of Euro-3 class since 2012 and of Euro-4 class to ap-
ply from 2015. The Strategy to 2030 envisages that oil processing depth will 
increase from 71.2% to 83% within the next ten years, and to 89–90% in 2030.
34 A. Meshcherin, ‘Khomut na sheyu’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 7, 2010, p. 12.
35 http://www.orlen.pl/PL/RelacjeInwestorskie/Documents/Company_overview_PL_March 
_2011.pdf
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However, the technological modernisation of the refinery sector will be in-
credibly expensive. The Ministry of Energy estimates that the investments 
necessary for 2015 will cost US$20 billion36, and the General Scheme of De-
velopment of the Oil Industry will require US$30 billion within the next ten 
years. This level seems unattainable and the oil sector, which will have to 
incur the high costs of investment in new oil fields in the immediate future, 
will probably be unable to earn such funds. In the opinion of Russian experts 
and oil companies, the reforms the government is trying to force through by 
administrative means are too ambitious, and thus unrealistic. It certainly 
appears that the reforms will be impossible to carry out within the deadlines 
which have been set. The petrol deficit which occurred in some parts of the 
country in spring 2011 – which was partly an effect of the ban on the sale of 
Euro-2 fuel – has proven that refineries are unable to meet the new require-
ments. 
Chart 7. Dynamics of oil production and processing in Russia between 1992 
and 2011
Data: Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation
36 Interfax-ANI, 7-13 July 2011.
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3.2. The export of petroleum products 
Exports of petroleum products have significantly increased over the past few 
years (see Chart 8). They have been growing at a faster rate than crude oil ex-
ports and have increased by 109% since 2000. However, low-processed prod-
ucts which are used as semi-finished products to be processed further by for-
eign refineries are predominant in the foreign sales structure, which is a result 
of the technological backwardness of Russian refineries. It is especially worth 
noting that heavy fuel oil (mazut) has a 48% share in exports, while petrol has 
a share as low as 3.4% (diesel oil’s share is 30.3%)37.
Since the exported petroleum products are of low quality, their prices are low, 
too. Furthermore, until October 2001, the export duty rate on low-processed 
products was much lower than that on highly process products (respectively 
46.7% and 67% of the value of the export duty on crude oil). A similar fiscal sys-
tem prevented the modernisation of refineries, since it de facto favoured out-
dated production and made its exports more profitable. The return on sales of 
high-quality petrol was 10%, while that on heavy fuel oil, which needs a much 
shorter refining process, was 30%38. Meanwhile, according to estimates from 
the Ministry of Energy, if Russia had exported oil at the price of US$70 per bar-
rel instead of petroleum products, the state budget would have gained US$13 
billion more in annual revenues39.
A unified export duty rate of 66% of the customs duty on oil was imposed on 
oil petroleum products in October 2011. In practice, this means a reduction of 
the customs duty on highly processed products and an increase on the low-
processed ones. The government is hoping that the new duty rates will result 
in a reduction in the amounts of heavy fuel oil exported and an increase in 
the exports of highly processed products and at the same time will allow oil 
companies to earn approximately US$2.5 billion more annually and spend this 
income on the modernisation of refineries. 
37 Data from the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation for 2010.
38 ‘Neftepererabotka: tak zhit nelzya’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010, p. 64.
39 ‘Mazutu dadut yeshcho dva goda’ Neft i Kapital, no. 12, 2009.
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Chart 8. Exports of petroleum products from Russia between 2000 and 2011
Data: Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation
The sale of low-processed (and thus cheap) products is not the only cause of 
the problem with the low profitability of exports of Russian petroleum prod-
ucts. Another reason is the economically irrational distribution of the refin-
eries, which are located far from the main outlets in Russia and far from the 
export sea ports. As a consequence, transport costs increase their prices and 
negatively affect their competitiveness on international markets. All Russian 
refineries, with the exception of those in Kirishi (Leningrad oblast) and Tua-
pse by the Black Sea are located deep inside Russia40. Thus Russian refineries 
must transport their products great distances, which makes their price higher 
by US$ 20–30 per tonne in the case of refineries located in the European part 
of the country and by as much as US$80 in the case of Siberian refineries41. 
Furthermore, Russia is short of product oil pipelines – the cheapest means of 
transport – and manufacturers must transport their products by rail, which 
is much more expensive. Last but not least, the outdated systems used at the 
refineries result in high energy consumption in the refinery sector, which is 
two to three times higher than in the case of Western refineries42.
40 The reason for building them in such places during Soviet times was the need to secure the 
refineries in case of an armed conflict. 
41 N. Pusenkova, A. Bessonova, ‘Blesk i nishcheta rossiyskoy pererabotki’ Rabochiye materi-
aly moskovskogo Centra Carnegie, no. 2, 2008, p. 13.
42 V. Kapustin, ‘Problemy razvitiya neftepererabotki v Rossii’, 6 October 2006, http://www.
oilcapital.ru/technologies/2006/10/061059_98699.shtml
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The changes in the export duty rates mean that exports of Russian petroleum 
products may even go down (for more information on this, see Chapter V, sec-
tion 2). This issue is especially serious if one considers the need to fill the oil 
pipelines which are now under construction (ESPO and BPS-2). This can also be 
concluded from certain statements by state officials; for example, Prime Min-
ister Vladimir Putin said in December 2009, “One should build what brings 
profits. This may seem paradoxical, but from the economic point of view today 
it is more profitable to sell crude oil and not petroleum products”43. Many Rus-
sian experts agree with this stance and are presenting arguments for Russia 
not to increase the volume of oil processed in Russian refineries, since exports 
of crude oil are much more cost-efficient44. The Ministry of Energy also be-
lieves that annual refinery output at a level of 230–240 million tonnes is opti-
mal although this is contrary to the guidelines of the Strategy to 2030, which 
envisages a regular increase in oil processing output in Russia45. It is worth 
emphasising that no new refinery is being built in Russia apart from the devel-
opment of the refinery in Nizhnekamsk, which was completed in 2010, and the 
development of the Kirishi and Tuapse refineries currently in progress. 
3.3. Expansion to foreign refinery markets
An analysis of the policy adopted by the Russian government towards the re-
finery industry leads to the conclusion that the goal of this policy is to make oil 
companies invest more actively in takeovers of refineries and fuel distribution 
networks outside Russia, especially in EU member states. The construction of 
new refineries in Russia would take a lot of time and expense, as would the 
modernisation of the existing ones to make exports of highly processed petro-
leum products possible. Given this situation, the best solution is to intensify 
foreign expansion – taking over refineries abroad and supplying Russian crude 
oil to them. This is vital for Russian firms because their produced oil versus 
processed oil ratio is several times lower than is the case with large Western 
companies, which usually process more oil than they produce themselves. 
43 http://premier.gov.ru/visits/ru/8759/events/8815/ 
In May 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said, however, that Russian manufacturers 
should “export not oil but highly processed petroleum products (…), which is more profita-
ble and creates new jobs” http://government.ru/docs/1374/print/
44 M. Sergeyev, ‘Ekonomisty predlagayut likvidirovat v Rossii neftepererabotku’ Nezavisima-
ya Gazeta, 30 March 2011.
45 Interfax-ANI, 16-22 June 2011.
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Their policy results from the fact that as a rule it is more profitable to sell pe-
troleum products than crude oil. 
Over the past few years, Russian firms have been actively increasing their 
presence on the refinery markets outside Russia. Currently, they own or co-
own refineries in Ukraine (TNK-BP and LUKoil), Romania (LUKoil), Bulgaria 
(LUKoil), Serbia (Gazprom Neft), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zarubezhneft), 
Italy (LUKoil), the Netherlands (LUKoil and Gunvor) and Germany (Rosneft), 
and share in refineries in Belarus (Slavneft) and up until May 2011 in Hun-
gary (Surgutneftegaz). The area in which Russian companies are especially 
interested are those countries to which they may supply their crude oil at low 
expense, ideally using the Druzhba oil pipeline. These are the countries of Cen-
tral Europe and Germany. It is a well-known fact that Gazprom Neft has been 
attempting to gain stakes in refineries in the Czech Republic (Česká rafinér-
ská) and eastern Germany (Schwedt and Leuna), while TNK-BP was making 
efforts in 2011 to buy a 53% stake in Poland’s Lotos. Although it is the Russian 
state which is acting as the initiator of the foreign expansion, the companies 
themselves are convinced that the expansion is a rational business strategy. 
Therefore, it may be expected that they will become more active in taking over 
refinery and downstream assets in the EU.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
12
37
Map 3. Refineries owned or co-owned by Russian oil companies
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IV. tHE oIL SEctor’S ProBLEMS
Despite the increase in oil production by almost 200 million tonnes in one decade, 
many problems have been accumulated in the Russian oil sector and are posing 
a serious challenge to its future, and may thus adversely affect the economic sit-
uation in Russia. However, the Russian government over the past few years has 
seen no need to change its approach to this most important branch of the Rus-
sian economy. One possible example of this is what Deputy Prime Minister Igor 
Sechin said in 2009, “there are no problems in the oil sector as a whole which 
would require any emergency action [from the government]”46. The Kremlin is 
unwilling to carry out reforms primarily due to the fear that budget revenues 
could be reduced since these are heavily dependent on oil-generated income. 
The uncertainty the companies have about the government’s policy is signifi-
cantly impeding the development of the sector as a whole. This can be illus-
trated by a statement by Vladimir Bogdanov, the president of Surgutneftegas, 
a company which is believed to be top of the class, whose development results 
were the indicators illustrating the condition of the entire sector for the past 
few years. Bogdanov said that his company could increase its output from 59 
million tonnes to 85 or even 100 million tonnes annually, but – given the situa-
tion, mainly fiscal, in which oil companies are forced to function now – this is 
economically unfeasible47. The key problems, which have been discussed in de-
tail below, include: state ownership and political control of the sector, govern-
ment discrimination in favour of state-owned companies, the inefficient fiscal 
system, one of the effects of which is an insufficient level of investment, and 
restricted access for foreign investors. 
1. State control and political supervision
A vast part of the Russian oil sector was privatised in the mid 1990s, and al-
most all oil companies became controlled by Russian oligarch capital. Due to 
the weakness of state institutions and informal influence from Russian oli-
garchs, the government did not use the instruments it had to control the oil 
sector. However, fundamental changes took place at the end of the first term 
in office of Vladimir Putin as president, which was manifested by the ‘Yukos 
affair’, which was an attack on Russia’s largest oil company inspired by the 
46 Quotation from: ‘Strashilki ot Minenergo’ Razvedka & Dobycha, no. 2, 2011, p. 11.
47 ‘Yest beguny na korotkiye distantsii, a my stayery’ Kommersant, 29 April 2008. 
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
12
39
government. Yukos was led to artificial bankruptcy, and its assets were taken 
over by Rosneft, the only state-owned oil company at that time48. An effect of 
the ‘Yukos affair’ was that the sector found itself under the direct supervi-
sion of the government elite. Furthermore, in 2005, Gazprom bought Sibneft, 
which was a private company (currently Gazprom Neft), as a consequence of 
which the share of state-controlled companies in total Russian oil production 
has grown from 24% in 2003 (i.e. the time before the ‘Yukos affair’) to 37% at 
present. However, if one takes into account the informal control which repre-
sentatives of the government have in some private companies (Surgutneftegas, 
Slavneft, Bashneft and Russneft), this share will rise to almost 50%. 
The state’s control of a significant part of the Russian oil sector reflects its stra-
tegic significance and status of main contributor to the state budget. However, 
the government can successfully influence not only state-owned companies 
but also private ones, for example, by using threats to cancel the production 
licence, by imposing a high financial penalty for alleged ecological damage, 
etc. One important instrument of the government’s influence is the company 
Transneft, which decides on access to the transport infrastructure, includ-
ing export. Therefore, when private companies make key decisions, they must 
informally obtain consent from the government, especially if the ownership 
structure of a given entity is to be changed. This de facto means that the gov-
ernment has total control of the Russian oil sector. 
Members of the ruling class, and above all Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, are 
playing a key role in determining the priorities for development of the oil sector. 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin is the government’s person in charge of polit-
ical supervision of the oil sector. He has been lobbying for its interests, especially 
of Rosneft, where he was chairman of the supervisory board until April 201149. 
The Ministry of Energy, which acts mainly as the administrative supervisor and 
the performer of the Kremlin’s orders, is playing a minor role. The Ministry of 
Finance in turn has a strong impact on the oil sector because it determines the 
fiscal system and is lobbying for high tax rates to be maintained. 
48 For more see: W. Konończuk, ‘The “Yukos Affair”, its Motives and Implications’ OSW Stud-
ies, no. 25, August 2006, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2006-08-15/
yukos-affair-its-motives-and-implications
49 Until mid 2011, senior state officials held key positions in the supervisory bodies of many 
state-owned companies. They had to resign after the ban on the simultaneous holding of 
positions in state institutions and companies, which was initiated by President Medvedev, 
was introduced. This, however, did not weaken their real, albeit now behind-thescenes, 
influence on the running of these firms. 
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Some individuals who do not hold any official posts but owing to their connec-
tions with the political elite, including Prime Minister Putin, may successfully 
influence state politics are also playing an essential role. Their actions are aimed 
at securing their private business interests in the sector and often contradict 
the interests of the state. The most influential individuals include: Gennady 
Timchenko, a co-owner of Gunvor, the largest exporter of Russian oil, holding 
a share of around 30%50, and of the gas company Novatek; Arkady Rotenberg, 
the owner of the Novorossiysk port; and Ziyavudin Magomedov, the owner of 
Summa holding, which controls, among other entities, part of the oil terminal in 
Primorsk, the Stroynovatsiya firm, which is participating in the construction of 
the ESPO and BPS-2 oil pipelines, and the Souz Petrolium trader firm51.
The government has total control of the oil sector because it is a sector of stra-
tegic significance and also because of the desire of part of the political elite to 
accumulate personal wealth52. The state-controlled companies and Transneft 
have especially many ‘satellite’ companies which are linked to politicians or 
members of their management. As a consequence, the priorities of the energy 
sector’s development depend on the political and financial interests of part of 
the ruling class. As a result, some oil projects are being performed contrary 
to economic logic and are used as means to siphon off public funds. Embezzle-
ment has occurred during the implementation of very expensive oil projects, 
including the construction of the ESPO and BPS-2 oil pipelines53. 
The combination of private and state interests and the influence from various 
decision-making centres on the formation of the oil policy (the prime minis-
ter, president, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, the Ministry of Energy, 
the Ministry of Finance, and Transneft), whose interests often collide, make 
Russia deprived of a consistent strategy regarding the key sector of its econo-
my. The Energy Strategy to 2030, which was adopted only six years after the 
50 For more see: W. Konończuk, ‘Making money on the crisis in Russia: the case of Gennady 
Timchenko’ OSW Commentary, no. 31, 28 December 2009, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/de-
fault/files/Commentary_31.pdf
51 Souz Petrolium, a company registered in Switzerland, is the main supplier of oil to PKN 
Orlen: it signed a three-year contract for the supply of 4.8 million tonnes of oil annually 
in November 2009, and in December 2011 it signed another three-year contract for annual 
supplies of 2.4 million tonnes of oil. 
52 P. Hanson, ‘The Resistible Rise of State Control in the Russian Oil Industry’ Eurasian Geogra-
phy and Economics, no. 1, 2009, pp. 14–27.
53 For more on this issue see the investigation by the famous Russian blogger, Alexey Navalny, 
‘Kak pilat v Transnefti’ 16 November 2010, http://navalny.livejournal.com/526563.html8
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endorsement of the Energy Strategy to 2020, is mainly a means of propaganda. 
It is aimed at demonstrating the country’s energy potential. Some of its provi-
sions included in the part concerning oil are contrary to the present policy. 
Many decisions are taken by the state administration under the influence of 
lobbying from certain institutions and firms and are not a consequence of well-
though out, long-term activities. 
2. the privileges of state-controlled companies
Since a significant part of the oil sector is state-controlled, the government 
is discriminating in favour of state-owned companies (Rosneft and Gazprom 
Neft) or those controlled by the ruling class (for example, Bashneft and Sur-
gutneftegas). These firms may count on lobbying in their favour from the most 
senior state officials. Examples of special treatment of some entities include 
preferences given to them in setting the export schedule54 and granting them 
the best production licences55. Although formally tenders are held, their results 
are often fixed so that one particular company wins. The most recent example 
of this was the granting of the licence at the end of 2010 to Bashneft for the 
development of the Trebsa and Titova field (Timan-Pechora), one of the largest 
the state still had at its disposal56. Another example of unequal treatment is 
the temporary lifting of the export duty on oil from Eastern Siberia, the main 
beneficiary of which is Rosneft. 
One more example is the legal provision of 2008, which regulates that raw 
materials on the Russian continental shelf (with the exception of the Caspi-
an Sea and the Sea of Azov) can be produced only by state-controlled firms57. 
This means that the competition has been restricted to four firms: Rosneft, 
Gazprom, Gazprom Neft and Zarubezhneft, the latter of which is a small com-
pany and does business primarily outside of Russia. Meanwhile, it is LUKoil, 
a private company, which has the largest experience with work on underwa-
ter fields. Similar legal restrictions cause significant delay in the utilisation of 
the natural wealth on the Russian continental shelf, since three companies are 
unable to cope with this task. According to the government’s intention, this is 
to contribute to continuing growth of the share of state-controlled companies 
54 The export schedule, i.e. the quantities of oil a given company may send in a defined direction 
and at a defined time, is determined by Transneft in consultation with the Ministry of Energy.
55 The Ministry of Natural Resources is in charge of granting production licences. 
56 O. Gavshina, ‘Sdielka iz proshlogo’ Vedomosti, 3 December 2010.
57 D. Rebrov, ‘Gazprom i Rosneft idut na dno’ Kommersant, 17 April 2008.
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in oil production and thus also in their significance. The other firms may take 
part in the production on the continental shelf only as subcontractors of the 
state-owned companies. 
3. the inefficient tax system
3.1. Characteristics of the tax system
High tax rates are among the chief problems of the oil sector, which signifi-
cantly inhibits its development and potentially poses serious consequences for 
its future. The primary goal of the Russian fiscal system regarding this branch 
of the economy is to gain the highest possible budget revenues. Nothing in the 
system performs the function aimed at stimulating its development. With the 
present tax rates, it is unprofitable to develop 90% of new fields and 30% of the 
old fields already in operation, which in aggregate accounts for half of all oil 
deposits in Russia58.
The tax systems currently in force were created at the beginning of the first 
presidency of Vladimir Putin, when oil prices started growing rapidly. Two key 
taxes were then imposed on oil companies: the tax on the extraction of mineral 
resources (NDPI) and the export duty. While oil companies had been able to 
keep as much as 70% of their income, the two taxes imposed a much heavier 
fiscal burden on them (see Chart 9).
The rate of NDPI, which was introduced in 2002, depends on the current oil 
price and reaches approximately US$15 per barrel. Thus it is a simple mecha-
nism which automatically siphons a significant part of the income of oil com-
panies off to the state budget. The main criticism of NDPI concerns its flat rate, 
namely the fact that it is imposed at an equal amount on oil extracted from all 
fields, regardless of their geographical location, geological structure, degree of 
depletion and production costs. Thus this tax is encouraging production at the 
best and easiest to extract fields, and one of its consequences is the irrational 
overexploitation of some of the fields. In the opinion of Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
one of the most important magazines dealing with oil and gas in Russia, NDPI 
stands for “primitivisation of the payment system (…) to improve the tax col-
lection rate, with a damaging effect on the rationality of field production”59.
58 ‘Zhertva dobychi’ RusEnergy, 25 October 2010.
59 ‘Nalogooblozheniye: nozhnitsi Kudrina i pryaniki dla izbrannykh’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
no. 5, 2010, p. 17.
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Another major fiscal levy is the export duty, the rate of which in the past two 
years ranged between 65% and 67% of the value of oil above US$25 per barrel. 
The duty rate changes every month and depends on the average oil price in the 
preceding month60. On 1 October 2011, the duty rate was reduced to 60%. As 
demonstrated in the chart below, the higher the oil price, the more intensive 
the growth of the fiscal levies imposed on Russian oil companies. At the price 
of US$30 per barrel, the share of NDPI and export duty is 35.1% of the oil price. 
When the price reaches US$50, the taxes grow to 55.9%, while at the price of 
US$100, the taxes reach 71.4%. This means that higher oil prices translate to 
higher incomes for oil producers to a very limited extent. For comparison, in 
Brazil, whose tax system is often presented as a model to be followed in the tax-
ation of oil companies, the share of taxes in a barrel of oil worth US$100 is 41%61.
Chart 9. Percentage share of the NDPI tax and export duty in the Urals oil price
Data: Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010
60 Until 2010, export duty changed every two months, which in the case of rapid price growth 
offered oil companies additional profits and also high losses, when prices dropped rapidly. 
When the prices went down dramatically in the second half of 2008 some smaller firms 
even had to withhold production because the fiscal levies were higher than their incomes. 
61 O. Gavshina, Y. Mazneva, A. Trifonov, ‘Reshitelnyi i shchedryi’ Vedomosti, 31 August 2011.
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NDPI and export duty are not the only fiscal levies imposed on the oil sector. 
Additionally, excise duty is imposed on petroleum products, and companies 
pay income tax, which has significantly increased since 2004 to reach a rate 
of 20% in the past few years. As a consequence, taxes currently take between 
75% and 80% of the profits generated by oil companies (see Chart 10). The fiscal 
system leaves oil companies with income sufficient to continue production on 
the already used fields but too small for significant investments in new, usually 
capital-intensive upstream projects. Even the record-high oil prices have failed 
to provide a stimulus for oil companies to embark on the large-scale develop-
ment of new fields or to invest in difficult-to-access oil fields. The main cause 
for this is the fact that the tax system performs only the fiscal function of sup-
plying revenues to the state budget, which is increasingly dependent on the 
oil sector, and which at the same time fails to stimulate production and act as 
a mechanism for setting the trends of its development. 
Chart 10. Taxes imposed on the profits oil companies between 1999 and 2009
Data: Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010
Another kind of tax Russian companies must pay are the oil transport fees col-
lected by Transneft. These are usually much higher than the actual oil trans-
port costs, since this state-controlled company must compensate this way for 
the huge expenses it has incurred over the past few years in connection with 
the construction of new oil pipelines, including primarily ESPO, BPS-2 and 
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Purpe–Samotlor. This is then in fact another fiscal burden for the oil sector, 
which has an additional adverse impact on the conditions of its operation. Only 
in 2009–2011, Transneft’s transport tariff increased by 71% and is one of the 
highest among oil producer countries62. In 2009, transport of one tonne of oil 
at a distance of 100 km cost US$0.95 in Russia, while it was US$0.44 in Canada 
and US$0.68 in the USA63.
3.2. Attempts to improve the fiscal situation
In connection with increasing criticism of the fiscal system coming from oil 
companies and some experts, the government took action to liberalise it to 
some extent. This however did not take the form of a comprehensive reform, 
but was a rather fragmentary action in some areas. In 2007, the NDPI rate was 
slightly reduced for fields depleted to over 80%, and this tax was lifted com-
pletely in the case of the fields located in Yakutia, Irkutsk oblast and Krasno-
yarsk Krai for 10 to 15 years or until 25 million tonnes of oil have been pro-
duced64. In 2009, NDPI was also temporarily lifted for fields on the Polar shelf 
(until 35 million tonnes have been extracted), on the shelves of the Caspian Sea 
and the Sea of Azov (up to 10 million tonnes, for no longer than seven years), 
in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and in Yamal (15 million tonnes for seven 
years). However, this measure has improved the situation of the oil sector as 
a whole to a very limited extent since output levels in this region are still low, 
with the exception of the Vankor field65. 
The most important of the attempts to improve the financial conditions of the 
operation of oil companies was the lifting of the export duty on thirteen oil 
fields in Eastern Siberia in December 2009. In January 2010, this list was ex-
tended to twenty-two fields, although real production was in place in only four 
of these fields. However, the duty was imposed again in May 2011 due to a pro-
test from the Ministry of Finance. The most recent moves made by the gov-
ernment to improve the fiscal environment were: the reduction of oil export 
62 O. Gavshina, ‘Privilegiya Transnefti’ Vedomosti, 26 August 2011.
63 ‘Zhertva dobychi’ RusEnergy, 25 October 2010.
64 A. Bessonova, ‘Neftedobycha v Rossii’ Rabochiye materialy moskovskogo Centra Carnegie, 
no. 1, 2009, pp. 15-18. 
65 The aggregate output at the Vankor field exceeded 25 million tonnes in September 2011, so 
the regular NDPI rate has been imposed on this field since then. 
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duty from 65% to 60% from October 201166 and lifting NDPI in August 2011 for 
oil from the shelves of the Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk (until 20 million 
tonnes have been extracted), from the fields located in the Yamalo-Nenets Au-
tonomous Okrug (up to 30 million tonnes) and those with deposits of less than 
5 million tonnes67.
Contrary to appearances, the Russian government has done little over the past 
four years, and the actions it has taken will not bring about a real improve-
ment in the situation of the oil sector. The measures taken are fragmentary, 
fail to bring system changes and extend to fields which account for only a few 
percent of Russian oil output. In the case of old fields, where a vast share of 
Russian oil is produced, apart from the slight reduction in the export duty, no 
comprehensive action has been taken to improve the situation. Furthermore, 
a significant part of the solutions adopted brought benefits above all to the 
state-controlled companies, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft. Nevertheless, even 
Rosneft, with its great lobbying potential among the most senior state officials, 
has not been able to maintain the zero export duty rate on oil from Vankor. 
It also needs to be noted that the measures adopted concern primarily fields 
located in very unfavourable climate conditions and/or those which require 
expensive technological solutions. This, for example, concerns Gazprom Neft’s 
fields in the Yamalo-Nenets AO. This company estimates that owing to the lift-
ing of NDPI on these fields, it will gain approximately US$4.5 billion, which will 
significantly improve the return on investment, but at the same time assesses 
that the project will be possible to implement if the oil price is at least US$100 
per barrel and that it needs a temporary reduction in export duty. Rosneft also 
predicts that its investments in the fields on the continental shelf will only be 
possible if export duty is temporarily lifted. 
The solutions proposed by Russian companies and exporters indicate the need 
for a system-based reform of the entire sector instead of offering tax breaks 
to selected regions or upstream projects. They suggest among other solutions 
a gradual lifting of export duty on crude oil and at the same time the imposi-
tion of a higher NDPI on oil and excise duty on petroleum products, or – accord-
ing to another version– the introduction of one tax whose rate would depend 
66 The complex formula of the export duty is the following: 65% of the difference between the 
current price per tonne of oil and US$182.5 (this figure changes) to the base price of US$29.2 
per tonne of oil. The 65% rate has been replaced with 60% since October 2011. 
67 K. Melnikov, ‘Neftianikam obnulili stavku’ Kommersant, 22 July 2011.
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on a company’s income68. It has also been suggested that the rates of fiscal levies 
should depend on the distance which oil is transported. 
It seems that the government is aware of the need to carry out a thorough fis-
cal reform in this strategic sector of the Russian economy. At the end of 2010, 
the Ministry of Energy suggested reducing export duty to 55% and, in the 
case of new fields, introducing one income tax at the rate of 27%. According 
to its calculations, revenues to the state budget would fall by US$2.5 billion in 
the first year of this system’s operation but they would be 20% higher with-
in the next ten years than the presently applicable system would ensure69. 
Similar conclusions can be found in the General Scheme of Development of 
the Oil Industry to 2020, which predicts that if no radical fiscal reform is 
carried through, oil production will start falling dramatically in Russia, and 
may even be 30% lower within a little more than a decade (this is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter V).
Even though the government has an objective picture of the situation in the 
sector, its response to the existing challenges is insufficient and fragmentary 
due to the fear of the consequences of falling budget revenues. High prices are 
used as another excuse for the Kremlin’s passiveness. This, however, helps im-
prove the investment potential of oil companies only to a limited extent. Fur-
thermore, two groups are competing within the Russian ruling class. One of 
them, led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, the guardian of the oil sector, 
is lobbying for the introduction of fiscal changes. Meanwhile, the other group, 
whose centre is in the Ministry of Finance, opposes this or claims that the ac-
tions which have been taken already are sufficient. The latter group, whose 
stance guarantees budget revenues being maintained at a high level, is sup-
ported by a majority of the Russian elite responsible for making the key deci-
sions. This means that the chances for real change in the taxation of the oil 
sector are quite low in the immediate future. 
3.3. The consequences of the lack of a fiscal reform 
This, very circumspect, approach taken by the government proves that it 
fears that any thorough reform of the fiscal system pertaining the oil sector 
could lead to a significant reduction of budget revenues. While this scenario 
68 ‘Zhertva dobychi’ RusEnergy, 25 October 2010.
69 D. Kazmin, A. Peretolchina, F. Sterkin, ‘Syryevoye zaklatye’ Vedomosti, 12 October 2011.
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is in fact real in the short term, if no radical fiscal reform is carried through, 
oil production will fall, and all the negative consequences for the budget will 
take place anyway. Representatives of oil firms have been warning regularly 
that Russia has to choose between fiscal reform and durable output reduc-
tion70. Such opinions need to be seen not only as lobbying for a radical liber-
alisation of the tax system but also as a realistic warning that the fiscal levies 
currently in force are impeding the sector’s development and are posing the 
risk of a serious crisis.
In addition to the real imminent risk of a significant reduction in oil output, the 
overly aggressive fiscal system also has at least two other major consequenc-
es. Firstly, it is affecting the increased activity in foreign upstream projects, 
which has been observed among Russian companies over the past two years. 
These entities, expecting more favourable conditions for investment, started 
investing in deposits in various places across the world. A good illustration of 
this is the example of TNK-BP. This company, which had not previously invest-
ed in upstream outside Russia, bought shares in oil projects in Venezuela and 
Vietnam from BP in October 2010, took over a 45% stake in a Brazilian field for 
US$1 billion in July 2011 and is intending to participate in a tender for extrac-
tion licences in Iraq. Other Russian companies active abroad include: LUKoil 
(producing or exploring oil in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Ghana, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia), Gazprom Neft (Iraq and Iran), Rosneft (Algeria) and 
Tatneft (Libya and Syria). The scale and the acceleration of foreign expansion 
of Russian oil companies indicate that one of the key reasons for this is the un-
favourable investment climate in Russia. 
Secondly, the excessive fiscal burdens are adversely affecting the valuation 
of Russian companies, despite high oil prices. One example is Rosneft, whose 
stock-market value is five times lower than that of ExxonMobil, although Ros-
neft’s oil deposits are a third larger than those of ExxonMobil. In addition to 
the insufficient share of petroleum products in the total sales of Russian com-
panies, the other most important reason for this is the need to operate in an 
unfavourable fiscal environment. All Russian oil companies are affected by 
the problem of much lower capitalisation than their Western competitors with 
comparable output and reserves. 
70 See, for example, the statement by the deputy CEO of LUKoil, Leonid Fedun, Argus FSU 
Energy, 27 May 2011, p. 3.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
12
49
4. Insufficient investments
As a consequence of the excessive fiscal burdens imposed on the oil sector, Rus-
sian companies allocate insufficient funds to investment, including on geologi-
cal and exploration work and the development of already explored but still idle 
oil fields. The level of investment per barrel of extracted oil in Russia currently 
ranges between US$9 and US$10, and it was much lower recently, at US$5 to 
US$771. Meanwhile, the average value of this indicator for large international oil 
firms ranges between US$15 and US$2072. It needs to be admitted that the invest-
ment outlays of Russian oil companies have been increasing over the past five 
years owing to the oil price growth but they are still far from sufficient. While 
the annual investment level in 2000–2004 was at US$4–5 billion, it started in-
creasing rapidly in 2005 to reach US$11.4 billion in 2007 and US$25 billion in 2011 
(see Chart 11). For comparison, the investment expenses of ExxonMobil, which 
produces less oil than Rosneft, in 2011 were US$ 32 billion, which was higher 
than the investment expenses of all Russian oil companies in aggregate73.
Chart 11. The investment levels of oil companies in Russia between 2000 and 2011
Data: Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010 and own calculations on the basis of data from companies for  2010–2011
The Energy Strategy to 2030 forecasts that the level of necessary investments 
in the sector should reach US$609–624 billion within the next twenty years, in-
cluding US$491–501 billion on production and geological and exploration work 
71 ‘Investitsii’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010, p. 91.
72 ‘Chistaya pribyl neftegazovykh kompaniy RF mozhet prevysit $100 mld’, 30 May 2011, 
http://www.rosbalt.ru/business/2011/05/30/853490.html
73 Y. Kravchenko, ‘Bal Neftianikov’ Vedomosti, 13.09.2012.
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alone (see Table 2). This means that it is necessary to invest approximately 
US$24–25 billion annually; a level much higher than the present outlays. Fur-
thermore, oil companies will also have to incur the costs of the modernisation 
of the refinery sector and oil pipeline construction (Transneft’s network and 
the connections between their fields and Transneft’s system), which, accord-
ing to Strategy 2030, means additional costs of US$5.9–6.2 billion annually. In-
terestingly, a similar level of investment necessary to be made in the oil sector 
has been determined by the International Energy Agency (EA). According to 
its estimates, they should reach US$633 billion by 2035, of which US$44 billion 
would have to be allocated for the modernisation of the refinery sector74. Addi-
tionally, the Russian Ministry of National Resources estimates that the level of 
investment in the development of the Arctic shelf should reach approximately 
US$325 billion by 204075.
Table 2. Forecasted investment needs of the oil sector until 2030 (US$ billion) 
Investment level
Stage I
(to 2013-
2015)
Stage II
(to 2020-
2022)
Stage III
(to 2030) total
Production and 
geological and 
exploration work
110-111 109-112 272-278 491-501
Refinery sector 21-22 8-9 18-19 47-50
Transport 31-32 17-18 23-24 71-74
total 162-165 134-139 313-321 609-625
Data: Energy Strategy to 2030
The investment structure of Russian oil companies in 2010 was as follow-
ing: drilling in already active fields (40.2%), industrial construction (42%), 
equipment (13.3%), drilling for the exploration of new fields (3.6%) and other 
(0.9%)76. The low level of expenses on the exploration of new fields is notice-
able and this has been regularly falling over the past few years. The existence 
74 IEA World Energy Outlook 2010. 
75 I. Kezik, ‘Investitsii v defitsite’ Moskovskiye Novosti, 5 October 2011. 
76 A. Meshcherin, ‘Fasadnoye blagopoluchiye: neft i gaz Rossii 2010’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
no. 4, 2011, p. 42.
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of a crisis in this area is proven by the fact that while the level of drilling 
for the exploration of new fields in the early 1990s was approximately 7 mil-
lion metres annually, it was reduced to 0.86 million metres in 200977. Russian 
companies allocate approximately US$0.8 billion for new field exploration. 
Meanwhile, Russian experts estimate that the necessary level of annual in-
vestments in geological and exploration work should be at US$15–18 billion78. 
One of the reasons why the level of investment in this area is so low is be-
cause of legal regulations, which do not guarantee that a given firm will be 
given the right to develop the field it has discovered. The state’s share in the 
expenses on geological and exploration work is also low: it was US$310 mil-
lion in 2010 (an increase from US$100 million in 2005)79. For comparison, the 
public spending for this purpose in such countries as Canada, the USA or 
Brazil is at 5–8% of the total oil production value80.
The key question is: ‘Are Russian oil companies able to generate such vast 
funds by themselves?’ This seems possible, but on two conditions: firstly, this 
needs the investment climate to be improved, which means above all that the 
government should reduce the fiscal burden and create a competitive environ-
ment, for example, by offering equal conditions for doing business to state-con-
trolled and private oil companies instead of discriminating in favour of state-
controlled companies; secondly, oil prices must remain high, since otherwise 
the development of many fields would be unprofitable. The government is still 
more inclined to put the blame for the insufficient level of investment on com-
panies rather than to search for solutions, such as lowering taxes. One exam-
ple of this was the statement made by Prime Minister Putin in July 2011, who 
criticised oil companies for insufficient investment and reproached them for 
having paid US$8 billion in dividends for 201081.
The overall net profit of the eight largest oil companies, which control 90% of 
total Russian output, reached US$48.9 billion in 2011 (see Table 3). This is quite 
a considerable sum. It is true that part of Russian firms allocate significant 
amounts of money on foreign investments, which must be happening at the 
expense of reducing their possibilities of investing in Russia. Furthermore, 
almost all large oil companies in Russia have loans to repay, the total value of 
77 ‘Gosudarstvo ukhodit’ Nefteservis, no. 1/2011.
78 ‘Resursnaya baza: slivki konchilis’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 5, 2010, p. 44.
79 ‘Gosudarstvo ukhodit’ Nefteservis, no. 1/2011.
80 ‘Resursnaya baza: slivki konchilis’…, op. cit., p. 42.
81 Data: The General Scheme of Development of the Oil Industry to 2020.
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which at the beginning of 2012 exceeded US$44 billion (see Table 3), and must 
allocate part of their income on servicing current debt82. Regardless of all this, 
an improvement of the investment climate, and especially of the fiscal environ-
ment, would provide a strong stimulus for Russian oil companies to increase 
the level of their investments in the development of new fields and geological 
and exploration work.
Table 3. Net profit of oil companies in 2011 and their debts as of beginning  
of 2012 (US$ billions)
oil company Profit debt
Rosneft 12.4 15.8
LUKoil 10.3 6.3
TNK-BP 8.9 6.7
Surgutneftegas 8 0
Gazprom Neft 5.35 5.8
Tatneft 1.75 2.6
Bashneft 1.6 2.3
Russneft 0.67 5.06
totAL 48.9 44.5
Source: Own calculations based on data from companies
Investments could grow significantly in the Russian oil sector and its general 
situation would improve if foreign investors were given better access to the 
sector than has previously been the case. 
5. Limited access for foreign investors 
The Russian oil sector is to a great extent inaccessible to international corpora-
tions, which means that the necessary capital and competition are limited. The 
82 Own calculation, based on data from companies.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
12
53
share of foreign investors is strictly restricted, which is an effect of a change in 
the previously quite liberal government policy that took place during the first 
term in office of Vladimir Putin as president, as a consequence of which the law 
has become less flexible. According to legal regulations, if a non-Russian entity 
wishes to acquire more than a 10% stake in a Russian firm in sectors defined 
as strategic – including the oil sector – consent from the governmental com-
mission for foreign investment control is required83. There are also unofficial 
rules, not recorded in legislation, according to which political approval is re-
quired for each significant foreign investment, especially if the acquisition of 
a considerable part of shares in a Russian firm by foreign capital is envisaged. 
The nationalisation and the ruling class’s control of the oil sector, which have 
been intensifying over the past few, years mean that in practice international 
entities may count only on minority stakes in Russian energy companies, and 
thus will not gain real influence on the way they are managed. 
The shareholding structures of the largest Russian oil companies do not in-
clude any major foreign investors, with the exception of TNK-BP, 50% of whose 
shares are owned by BP. BP also owns 1.3% of Rosneft shares, which it bought 
during this firm’s IPO at the London Stock Exchange in 2006. 
Foreign investors also hold shares in a few small firms, which are often joint 
ventures with Russian companies. India’s ONGC holds 100% of the shares in Im-
perial Energy, China’s CNPC 49% in Vostok Energy (Rosneft holds the remain-
ing 51%), PetroVietnam holds 49% of the shares in Rusvietpetro (Zarubezhneft 
holds the remaining 51%), and China’s Sinopec holds 49% of the shares in Ud-
murtneft (Rosneft holds the remaining 51%). Foreign firms also participate in 
several upstream projects as minority partners for Russian firms, which is 
shown in Table 4. 
83 A legislative amendment is being prepared which will raise this threshold to 25%.
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Table 4. The share of foreign firms in Russian oil projects 
oil field name Shareholders reserves Project stage
Sakhalin-1
ExxonMobil (30%), 
Sodeco (30%), ONGC 
(20%)
256 million tonnes
annual production 
of 9 million tonnes
Sakhalin-2
Shell (27.5%), Mitsui 
(12.5%), Mitsubishi 
(10%) 
150 million tonnes
production of ap-
proximately 8 mil-
lion tonnes
Sakhalin-3 
(Veninsky 
block)
Rosneft (74.9%), 
Sinopec (25.1%)
169 million tonnes
preparations for 
production launch 
are being made 
Kharyaga
Total (40%), Sta-
toilHydro (40%), 
Zarubezhneft (10%)
97 million tonnes
production of ap-
proximately 1 mil-
lion tonnes 
SeverEnergia 
company has 
fields in the 
Yamalo- 
-Nenets AO 
Eni and Enel (49%), 
Gazprom Neft and 
Novatek (51%)
568 million tonnes
field development 
has not started yet 
Thus, foreign companies, with the exception of BP’s stake in TNK-BP, still 
hold an insignificant share in the Russian oil sector. However, since 2010, 
the Russian government has been making hints at its readiness for a broader 
opening up to foreign investment84. The most important manifestations of 
this were the aforementioned agreement between BP and Rosneft (unsuc-
cessful) and between Rosneft and ExxonMobil concerning extraction from 
three blocks at the Kara Sea. In 2010, Rosneft also signed agreements with 
US companies ExxonMobil and Chevron, concerning common upstream pro-
jects on the Caspian shelf (the Tuapse Trough) and Black Sea shelf (the Shat-
sky Ridge) respectively85.
84 For more see: I. Wiśniewska, ‘Controlled opening-up of Russia’s energy sector to for-
eign investors’ EastWeek, 9 March 2011. http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/east-
week/2011-03-09/controlled-opening-russia-s-energy-sector-to-foreign-investors
85 In June 2011, Chevron and Rosneft ended their co-operation on this project. The official rea-
son for that were differences in the assessment of the potential deposits on the Shatsky 
Ridge.
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These deals are signs of Russia’s new approach to foreign investors. The Energy 
Strategy to 2030, which was adopted in 2009, already included a provision for 
attracting international investment. The attractiveness of Russian deposits to 
foreign entities, regardless of the existing political risk, makes them interest-
ed in participation in projects implemented in Russia. However, Moscow’s new 
policy in this area can be characterised as an opening up which is controlled, 
restricted and subject to many conditions. It also is not an effect of an improve-
ment in the investment climate or better co-operation conditions. Its main goal 
is an attempt to encourage selected large foreign firms to invest in risky, tech-
nically difficult and capital-intensive upstream projects, especially in those 
where Russian firms do not have the necessary technologies (this primar-
ily concerns fields located on the continental shelf). Investors are thus being 
treated mainly as a source of know-how and capital. Moreover, such projects 
usually require lengthy and expensive preparations, Russian firms as a rule 
keep the control package, and the investor is deprived of real influence on the 
management of the project. Furthermore, foreign companies are often allowed 
to invest in Russia on the condition of a mutual exchange of shares or the sale 
of attractive international assets to a Russian firm. 
It is still too early to sum up the results of the policy of a controlled opening up of 
the Russian oil sector to foreign investments. However, it may be expected that 
the Russian government will be more and more interested in increasing the 
level of foreign investments over the coming years, especially if oil production 
starts to drop. In many regions (the Arctic shelf, Eastern Siberia, and the Far 
East), Russian companies are unable to operate alone due to the technological 
complexity and large capital the fields require, and will need foreign partners. 
In the case of the Far East the decision on the choice of a given company will 
also be of high political significance (the choice between Chinese and Japanese 
firms). Engagement from foreign companies considerably more intensive than 
so far could accelerate many oil fields being put into operation and thus become 
a cure for the increasingly serious problems of the Russian oil sector. However, 
it is quite likely that foreign entities will expect that the protection of their in-
vestments be guaranteed and the unfavourable fiscal system changed86.
86 ‘Nevostrebovannyie bogatstva’ RusEnergy, 18 May 2011.
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V. HoW MucH oIL WILL ruSSIA ProducE And EXPort?
1. oil production forecast by 2030
In 2011, oil production in Russia reached 511.3 million tonnes, the highest level 
since the collapse of the USSR87. Russia’s major goal in oil policy is to maintain 
annual output within the next few years at around 500 million tonnes, which 
in the government’s opinion is ‘optimal’88. Despite the fact that proven Russian 
oil reserves are still vast, and that Russia probably has very large still undis-
covered deposits, it will be difficult to attain this goal since this will require 
a change in the government’s policy towards the oil sector. 
Official forecasts concerning oil production levels which can be found in vari-
ous Russian documents significantly differ from one another. The Energy 
Strategy to 2030, approved at the end of 2009, envisages that oil production 
will grow by approximately 5% within the next twenty years to reach an an-
nual level of 505–525 million tonnes in 2020–2022 and 530–535 million tonnes in 
2028–2030. In turn, the Geology Development Strategy to 2030 assumes that oil 
production will fall in 2015 to 490 million tonnes, and will then start growing 
a little to reach the level of 500 million tonnes in 2020 and 530 million tonnes 
in 2030 (see Table 5).
Table 5. Oil production forecasts by 2030 according to the Energy Strategy 
and the Geology Development Strategy (in million tonnes)
2010 fact 2015 2020 2025 2030
Energy Strategy to 2030 505 515 527 533.5 534
Geology development 
Strategy to 2030 505 490 500 - 530
Another forecast is provided in the General Scheme of Development of the Oil 
Industry to 2020, which was made public at the end of 2010 and endorsed in 
April 2001 by the Government Commission for the Fuel and Energy Complex. 
87 Annual oil production in the Russian SFSR in the late 1980s was 570 million tonnes.
88 See, for example, the speech by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, February 2011, http://pre-
mier.gov.ru/events/news/14105/O
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annual output within the next few years at around 500 million tonnes, which 
in the government’s opinion is ‘optimal’88. Despite the fact that proven Russian 
oil reserves are still vast, and that Russia probably has very large still undis-
covered deposits, it will be difficult to attain this goal since this will require 
a change in the government’s policy towards the oil sector. 
Official forecasts concerning oil production levels which can be found in vari-
ous Russian documents significantly differ from one another. The Energy 
Strategy to 2030, approved at the end of 2009, envisages that oil production 
will grow by approximately 5% within the next twenty years to reach an an-
nual level of 505–525 million tonnes in 2020–2022 and 530–535 million tonnes in 
2028–2030. In turn, the Geology Development Strategy to 2030 assumes that oil 
production will fall in 2015 to 490 million tonnes, and will then start growing 
a little to reach the level of 500 million tonnes in 2020 and 530 million tonnes 
in 2030 (see Table 5).
Table 5. Oil production forecasts by 2030 according to the Energy Strategy 
and the Geology Development Strategy (in million tonnes)
2010 fact 2015 2020 2025 2030
Energy Strategy to 2030 505 515 527 533.5 534
Geology development 
Strategy to 2030 505 490 500 - 530
Another forecast is provided in the General Scheme of Development of the Oil 
Industry to 2020, which was made public at the end of 2010 and endorsed in 
April 2001 by the Government Commission for the Fuel and Energy Complex. 
87 Annual oil production in the Russian SFSR in the late 1980s was 570 million tonnes.
88 See, for example, the speech by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, February 2011, http://pre-
mier.gov.ru/events/news/14105/O
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V. HoW MucH oIL WIL  ruS IA ProducE And EXPort?
1. oil production forecast by 2030
In 201 , oil production in Rus ia reached 51 .3 million ton es, the highest level 
since the collapse of the US R87. Rus ia’s major goal in oil policy is to maintain 
an ual output within the next few years at around 50  million ton es, which 
in the government’s opinion is ‘optimal’88. Despite the fact hat proven Rus ian 
oil reserves are still vast, and that Rus ia probably has very large still undis-
covered deposits, it will be difficult to at ain this goal since this will require 
a change in the government’s policy towards the oil sector. 
Official forecasts concerning oil production levels which can be found in vari-
ous Rus ian documents significantly differ from one another. The Energy 
Strategy to 2030, ap roved at the end of 20 9, envisages that oil production 
will grow by ap roximately 5% within the next twenty years to reach an an-
nual evel of 505–525 million ton es in 2020–202  and 530–535 million ton es in 
2028–2030. In turn, the Geology Development Strategy to 2030 as umes that oil 
production will fall in 2015 to 490 million ton es, and will then start growing 
a lit le to reach the level of 50  million ton es in 2020 and 530 million ton es 
in 2030 (se  Table 5).
Table 5. Oil production forecasts by 2030 ac ording to the Energy Strategy 
and the Geology Development Strategy (in million ton es)
2010 fact 2015 2020 2025 2030
Energy Strategy to 2030 505 515 527 53 .5 534
Geology development 
Strategy to 2030 505 490 50 - 530
Another forecast is provided in the General Scheme of Development of the Oil 
Industry to 2020, which was made public at the end of 2010 and endorsed in 
April 20 1 by the Government Commis ion for the Fuel and Energy Complex. 
87 An ual oil production in the Russian SFSR in the late 1980s was 570 million ton es.
88 Se , for example, the spe ch by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, February 2011, http://pre-
mier.gov.ru/events/news/14105/O
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This document was ordered by the government and developed by the Ministry 
of Energy in co-operation with a number of Russian and foreign scientific and 
research centres. The general scheme presents two possible scenarios of oil pro-
duction levels in Russia to 2030 (see Chart 12). According to the first scenario, 
defined as ‘planned’, if the present environment which oil companies operate is 
maintained, oil production will be falling within the next few years at a fast rate 
to reach 454 million tonnes in 2015, 403 million tonnes in 2020 and 228 million 
tonnes in 2030. This will mean a radical fall by 20% within the next ten years and 
by 55% in twenty years, with all its negative consequences for the Russian state. 
According to the second scenario, which is defined as ‘designed’, if investments 
increase significantly and the government adopts a good policy, which will pri-
marily cover a liberalisation of the fiscal system applicable in the oil sector, oil 
production will be growing within the next few years to reach a maximum 
level of 571 million tonnes in 2017. Thus, if the environment in which oil compa-
nies operate changes, this document includes more optimistic oil production 
forecasts than Strategy 2030.  
Chart 12. Oil production forecasts in Russia by 2030 according to the General 
Scheme of Development of the Oil Industry
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However, the General Scheme predicts that after 2017 production will rapidly 
fall to 547 million tonnes in 2020, 470 million tonnes in 2025 and 346 million 
tonnes in 2030. This means that the suggested tax breaks will be able to hold 
off the reduction in Russian oil output for a few years but not prevent it, and 
its level in twenty years could be 31.5% lower than now. Nevertheless, this 
document includes a reservation that the production level after 2020 “will 
depend on the geological work conducted, new fields discovered and the de-
mand for oil”.
Of all the documents prepared by Russian state institutions containing 
forecasts for the development of the situation in the Russian oil sector, the 
General Scheme of Development of the Oil Industry to 2020 provides the 
most realistic picture of its future–even if one assumes that the alarmist 
approach adopted in this survey is also aimed at lobbying among the deci-
sion-makers to change the fiscal system in a way that would be beneficial 
for the oil sector. 
Most Russian experts are of the opinion that official forecasts, especially those 
provided in the Energy Strategy to 2030, are overly optimistic, and that pro-
duction is bound to fall in a decade or so the only unknown is how much it will 
fall by. For many Russian experts, one of the most reliable forecasts was pre-
sented in 2010 in Neftegazovaya Vertikal, a magazine dedicated to the oil and gas 
industry89. Its authors predict that a production peak at 506.5 million tonnes 
will take place in Russia in 2015. After this date, production levels will fall reg-
ularly to reach 498.1 million tonnes in 2020, 478.1 million tonnes in 2025 and 
443.1 million tonnes in 2030. These conclusions are in line with the predictions 
of many Russian experts, who believe that oil production levels will depend 
on the government’s policy but generally expect them to fall. Similar forecasts 
have been made by the IEA. According to its estimates, oil production in Rus-
sia will remain at the present level until 2015, and will then start falling: 7% 
by 2020 and 3.5% by 2025, to remain thereafter at that level until 2030–203590. 
Thus, according to the IEA, production will fall by approximately 50 million 
tonnes over fifteen years. 
89 Y. Podolsky, S. Kipelman, ‘Nizhe optimizma, vyshe pessimizma’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
no. 6, 2010.
90 IEA World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 128.
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In the opinion of the author of this text, the most likely scenario for the 
russian oil sector provides for a slight increase in oil production (by sev-
eral million tonnes annually) in the next two to three years, and thereaf-
ter production will start to fall below the level of 500 million tonnes. the 
degree of this fall will depend on the measure taken by the government, 
above all an improvement of the investment climate and the fiscal envi-
ronment. If the state oil policy changes, production may decrease by tens 
of millions of tonnes to 2030. However, if the actions taken by the gov-
ernment appear too circumspect, it cannot be ruled out that production 
could even fall below 400 million tonnes.
1.1. Eastern Siberia will not replace Western Siberia 
The main reason for the expected production fall is the deteriorating condi-
tion of oil fields in Western Siberia, the key Russian oil production centre. To-
tal output there fell by 5% in 2006–2010 and, according to most forecasts, will 
continue to fall in the future. The situation is especially bad in the oil fields in 
the Khanty-Mansi AO, where over 50% of total Russian oil production is tak-
ing place. Russian experts warn that the observed fall is independent of the 
increasing investment activity of oil firms, the significant intensification of 
drilling and the extensive use of technologies improving production efficien-
cy91. At best, output in this region will be maintained at a slightly lower level 
than now. More likely, however, its level will start to rapidly fall92. Even Strat-
egy 2030, with its optimistic forecasts, envisages that oil production in West-
ern Siberia will be regularly and irreversibly falling, and the fall may even 
reach 10% within the next five years. The situation is expected to show even 
greater deterioration in the Volga-Ural region, Russia’s second most important 
oil province, where – according to Strategy 2030 – output will be reduced 20% 
in ten years and by even more than 40% by 2030 in comparison to the level in 
2008 (see Table 6). This is due to: the high degree of depletion of the old fields, 
extensive production since 1991, and the fact that production is unprofitable in 
some fields in the present fiscal environment. 
91 M. Turukalov, ‘Zapadnaya Sibir: ot snizheniya dobychi do obvala’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, 
no. 6, 2009, p. 13.
92 Ibid. p. 14.
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Table 6. Oil production forecast in Russian regions according to the Energy 
Strategy to 2030 (million tonnes) 
region 2008 (fact) 2013-2015 2020-2022 2028-2030
Western Siberia 
332.7 294-310 286-312 301-303
Volga-ural
106.7 94-97 80-86 59-65
timan-Pechora 29.1 32-35 35-36 42-43
Eastern Siberia 0.5 21-33 41-52 75-69
Far East 13.8 23-25 30-31 32-33
northerncaucasus 4.8 7-11 19-20 21-22
totAL 487.6 486-495 505-525 530-535
The increase in Russian oil production, which has been observed over the past 
few years, may have a reassuring effect on the government by creating the il-
lusion that the situation in this sector is good. Meanwhile, this recent insig-
nificant production growth was mainly an effect of several new fields being 
put into operation, including above of all: Vankor, the largest oil field to have 
been developed in Russia since 1991, which will reach its output peak in 2012–
2013 (25 million tonnes annually); the Sakhalin fields, which were made ready 
for production owing to the technologies and capital of foreign companies; the 
Talakan and the Verkhnechonsk fields in Eastern Siberia; and the commence-
ment of production on the Caspian Sea shelf. Neither the new fields which have 
been in operation for a short amount of timenor those where production is due 
to start soon, i.e. mainly the fields in Eastern Siberia and the Caspian Sea shelf, 
will be able to compensate for the output fall in the traditional oil provinces in 
the medium and longer term. All official Russian documents make the same 
conclusion that Western Siberia and Volga-Ural will remain the key regions 
for at least twenty years in terms of not only production volume but also the 
increase in reserves owing to newly found fields. 
Another problem in the Russian oil sector is the fact that no new large fields are 
planned to be put into operation in the immediate future. Strategy 2030 envis-
ages that the significance of oil production in Eastern Siberia and the northern 
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part of Krasnoyarsk Krai (Vankor) will grow. However, its forecasts, according 
to which the total share of these regions and the Far East in overall Russian oil 
production will reach 18–19% by 2030, are overly optimistic. One of the goals 
set by the Russian government is to fill the ESPO oil pipeline – which is pres-
ently under construction – whose annual capacity is to reach 80 million tonnes 
after 2015. It seems impossible that this goal will be attained within the next 
decade or so. Even Strategy 2030 predicts that oil output in this region in twen-
ty years will reach 75 million tonnes as a maximum. However, many Russian 
experts believe that production forecasts for this region fail to correspond to 
data on available oil reserves. The fields already discovered and developed will 
be able to produce 50 million tonnes of oil annually at best, while reaching the 
level of 80 million tonnes as the government has assumed would require a dou-
blingin the intensification of geological and exploration work93. It still needs to 
be admitted that some experts believe that oil output in Eastern Siberia will be 
growing rapidly. According to estimates by the Siberian Branch of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, it will reach 76 million tonnes in 2020 and 87 million 
tonnes in 2030. In turn, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies assesses that it 
will be at a level of approximately 80 million tonnes after 2020 to rise to almost 
100 million tonnes a few years later94. Such forecasts are much more optimistic 
than those provided in Strategy 2030.
Eastern Siberia is a region where the level of geological exploration is still low. It 
also has to be borne in mind that the period between finding a field and reach-
ing the planned output is 10 to 15 years95. Another problem is the fact that oil 
reserves within the reach of the ESPO oil pipeline, i.e. those which do not re-
quire building new, expensive oil pipelines to connect it to fields located within 
a greater distance, include 667 million tonnes as proven reserves and 857 million 
tonnes as probable reserves; this is too little to fill ESPO96. Furthermore, the new 
fields require much more complex technologies and are predominantly located 
in areas with no infrastructure whatsoever. All this makes their operation ex-
pensive. The estimated value of necessary investments is approximately US$160 
billion by 2030 (jointly for Eastern Siberia and the Far East). Another problem 
93 A. Korzhubayew, I. Filimonova, L. Eder, ‘O realnykh perspektivakh kompleksnogo osvoy-
eniya resursov nefti i gaza vostoka Rossii’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, no. 20, 2010, p. 22.
94 J. Henderson, ‘The strategic implications of Russia’s Eastern oil resources’ The Oxford Insti-
tute for Energy Studies, January 2011, p. 60.
95 S. Kipelman, Y. Podolsky, ‘Nizhe optimizma…’ op. cit.; ‘ES’2030: ignoriruya realii Neftega-
zovaya Vertikal, no. 19, 2010, p.25.
96 O. Prishchepa, Y. Podolsky, ‘Mneniye WNIGRI: net po nefti i vozmozhno po gazu’ Neftega-
zovaya Vertikal, no. 20, 2010, p. 28. 
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with Eastern Siberian oil fields is that oil transport via the ESPO pipeline is ex-
pensive, since the real cost reaches US$130 per tonne. Since it is subsidised by 
Transneft (which at the same time sets excessively high tariffs for transport in 
the western direction), the present rate is US$61 per tonne. This is, however, af-
fecting the financial condition of Russian oil companies97.
the existing problems, the need to make large investments, the restricted 
access for foreign investors, and the long time the development of this new 
russian oil province requires; all this indicate that oil production levels 
in Eastern Siberia are very likely to increase at a slower rate than envis-
aged by the government. However, production growth could be accelerated 
through the reduction of fiscal levies (mainly export duty) and by allowing 
foreign investors to become engaged. The decision made in September 2011 by 
the Japanese government to withdraw from the use of nuclear energy within ten 
years may lead to increasing demand for Russian oil and gas and make Japanese 
firms more willing to make investments in Eastern Siberia and the Far East. 
1.2. A crisis or a change in government policy
As outlined in the previous chapters, a number of problems have accumulated 
in the Russian oil sector over the past few years. These problems have been 
additionally aggravated by the lack of a response from the Russian govern-
ment. One of the key issues is the insufficient level of investment expenditure, 
including on geological and exploration work – which is fundamental for the 
future of this sector – and on the development of new fields. The oil sector will 
start to feel the consequences of its chronic underinvestment in the past few 
years. The goals of the Energy Strategy include an increase in oil reserves by 
5.5 billion tonnes to 2020 and by 5.1 billion tonnes more to 2030, which would 
mean a 50% increase in proven oil reserves according to the Russian classifica-
tion and a 100% increase according to the international classification. It will 
be impossible to reach a level like this without a huge increase in investments. 
Furthermore, the quality of existing oil reserves is deteriorating, and extract-
ing them will be complicated due to the complexity of the geological structures 
in which they are located (difficult to extract oil makes up 60% of total re-
serves98), harsh climate conditions and the lack of a developed infrastructure 
and necessary technologies. 
97 Interfax ANI, 23–30 December 2009.
98 S. Filatov, O. Belyakova, ‘Osvoyeniye trudnoizvlekayemykh zapasov nefti: otsenka eko-
nomicheskoy effektivnosti’ Neftegazovaya Vertikal, nos. 23-24, 2010.
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Strategy 2030 and the IEA agree in their estimates that investments necessary 
in the Russian oil sector within the next twenty years should be at a level of 
US$30 billion annually. Therefore, since US$25 billion was invested in 2011, 
Russian oil companies need to generate an additional US$5 billion annually. 
Thorough fiscal reform would make it possible. The reduction of the export 
duty in 2011 and the lifting of NDPI for some future oil regions, although still 
insufficient to improve the situation, do, though, show that the government 
is aware of the imminent problem of a fall in production. However, the rul-
ing class fear the consequences of a decrease in oil-generated budget revenues. 
Therefore their actions regarding this strategic branch of the economy are 
very cautious and lack a broader vision. A fiscal reform would in fact reduce 
tax revenues but, as the general scheme is convincing, this reduction would be 
‘minor’ and after 2020 would be ‘compensated many times’ by higher incomes. 
Fiscal system reform is not the only factor to decide on the level of future out-
put. It is also necessary to end the existing informal division of oil companies 
into two categories. The first category includes state-owned companies and 
those linked to the government elite, which are favoured in receiving access to 
new fields and supported through the use of various administrative means. The 
second category includes private firms which may not count on any privileges 
and are reducing their investment plans and intensifying activity on interna-
tional markets, due to the deterioration of the investment climate in Russia. 
Small firms belong to a separate category. If the conditions in which they are 
doing business improve, they could develop many oil fields which large corpo-
rations are not interested in and thus contribute to overall production growth. 
Another issue which needs to be changed is the policy towards foreign inves-
tors. Although it seems that, with lighter fiscal burdens, Russian oil companies 
would be able to generate the funds needed for investments, they are still with-
out the technologies necessary in the case of many promising deposits (the Arc-
tic shelf and the Western Siberian unconventional oil fields). This means that, 
without engagement from large international firms, production in these fields 
– if not entirely impossible – would be postponed until a later time. A change in 
the government’s policy towards investors has been observed since 2010. One 
example of this is the engagement of ExxonMobil on the Caspian Sea. How-
ever, production at this flagship project will not start until after 2030. It would 
be more beneficial for the future of the Russian oil sector if foreign, including 
Asian, investors were given access to oil reserves in Eastern Siberia and the 
continental shelf in the Far East. 
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Summing up, it needs to be emphasised once more that it will be the state policy 
that has the strongest impact on the future of the Russian oil sector. Unless the 
ruling class change their approach to this sector and stop treating it primar-
ily as the key source of budget revenues, the crisis trend is bound to escalate. 
This will have grave consequences for the entire economy and the state which 
over the past few years has developed a heavy reliance on raw materials and 
a strong dependence on incomes from oil exports.
One more key factor, which will have a vast impact on the future of the Russian 
oil sector, needs to be mentioned. This factor is the oil price. The development 
of most new fields and part of the old ones will be unprofitable at a price lower 
than US$100 per barrel. A price fall continuing for a long time would spell ca-
tastrophe for the Russian state budget and the condition of oil companies. This 
would very likely mean the government would withdraw from the liberalisa-
tion of the fiscal policy, with all the negative consequences this would bring 
Russia and its oil sector.
2. Future oil export levels
Over the past few years, Russian oil exports have been at a level of around 
250 million tonnes annually. According to the Energy Strategy to 2030, oil 
export levels will be 243–244 million tonnes in 2013–2015, 240–252 million 
tonnes in 2022 and 222–248 million tonnes in 2030. The most likely export 
levels, according to the strategy, are presented in the table below. This 
means that the government expects oil exports to fall in 2030 by approxi-
mately 35 million tonnes in comparison to their present volume, this in the 
face of the forecasted output growth. This is due to an assumed increase in 
oil processing levels at Russian refineries, which is to grow from 247 mil-
lion tonnes in 2010 to 232–239 million tonnes in 2013–2015, 249–260 million 
tonnes in 2020–2022 and 275–311 million tonnes in 2030. Consumption of 
petroleum products is also expected to increase slightly in Russia to 125 
million tonnes annually by approximately 10% according to Strategy 2030 
and by 7% according to the IEA until 203099. The IEA estimates that Russia 
will overtake the United States and will become the global leader in terms 
of energy consumption per capita100.
99 IEA World Energy Outlook 2010, p. 107.
100 By 2035, energy consumption per capita in Russia will reach 6.4 tonnes of oil equivalent. 
Ibid. p. 89. 
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Chart 13. Forecast for Russian oil exports according to the Strategy to 2030
the decline in russian oil production predicted by the author of this text 
will inevitably entail a reduction in exports. the degree of this reduction 
will however depend on several factors, including mainly domestic de-
mand and oil processing volumes at russian refineries. Although Strategy 
2030 envisages a significant increase in the capacity of Russian refineries, the 
changes in the rates of export duty on crude oil and petroleum products intro-
duced in October 2011 may lead to a decrease in oil processing levels at Russian 
refineries and thus an increase in crude oil exports. Its estimated volume, ac-
cording to the Russian Ministry of Energy, is 20–25 million tonnes annually101. 
However, it is unclear whether this level will be sustained over the next few 
years, especially given the fact that the government has declared its desire to 
modernise Russian refineries and in the longer terms wishes to increase ex-
ports of petroleum products at the expense of crude oil, which should have 
a positive effect on the capitalisation of oil companies and on maintaining jobs 
in this sector. 
It can, therefore, be assumed that russian oil exports within the next 
three to four years could rise slightly above the present level of 250 mil-
lion tonnes, and will then gradually decrease as production declines. this 
prediction will be accurate provided that domestic consumption grows at 
a slow rate in the immediate future, and the state and oil companies make 
101 Y. Mazneva, ‘Eksportnyi proval’ Vedomosti, 5 September 2011.
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efforts to keep oil processing output at russian refineries at the present 
level or 10% lower. this means that the decrease in oil production will 
have the greatest impact precisely on export volume and is likely to cause 
a reduction in it of at least 10% and probably even more. 
3. Export directions: how much to Europe and how much to Asia? 
The Russian government has been declaring for years its desire to diversify oil 
exports. For decades, European countries have been the traditional major and 
almost exclusive recipients of Russian oil. This is linked to the geographical 
location of Russian deposits (the Urals, the Volga region and Western Siberia). 
Exports from these locations to Europe are the most rational economically. As 
a consequence of this, transport infrastructure in the western direction has 
been developed, starting already in Soviet times. Only small quantities of Rus-
sian oil have been sold to the American or Asian markets. In the case of the 
Sakhalin oil fields, the Asian markets and possibly the west coast of the USA 
are the natural destinations for exports. Since the late 1990s, small quantities 
of Russian oil have also been transported to China, initially by railway, and 
since January 2011 by the new oil pipeline, Skovorodino–Daqing, a branch of 
ESPO, with an annual capacity of 15 million tonnes. 
Over the past few years, Russia has been making clear efforts to reduce its de-
pendence on the European direction – which currently has an 80% share in to-
tal exports – by increasing its sales to Asian countries. Strategy 2030 assumes 
that the share of Asian markets in total oil export levels will double in twenty 
years from 12% at present to 22–25%102. The increase in exports to Asian coun-
tries is a direct consequence of embarking on the development of oil fields in 
Eastern Siberia, and their future volume will depend directly on the oil output 
in this region. The ESPO oil pipeline under construction, the first infrastruc-
tural project in Russia which is not directed towards the European market, is 
to contribute to the creation of a new oil province. While sale of oil from the 
Sakhalin or Eastern Siberian fields to customers in Asia is understandable for 
geographical reasons, the decision to transport oil via ESPO from the Vankor 
field in the northern part of Krasnoyarsk Krai, which will be the most impor-
tant raw material base for this pipeline for many years, is politically motivated. 
Considering the distance, it would be cheaper and more rational in economic 
terms to send this oil in the European direction. 
102 It is worth noting here that the Energy Strategy to 2020 even set a totally unrealistic goal of 
increasing Asia’s share in Russian oil exports from 3% at that time to 30% in 2020.
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As the production in the oil fields of Eastern Siberia, northern Krasnoyarsk 
Krai and Sakhalin increases as forecasted, the share of Asian countries in total 
export levels will grow. At the same time, due to the expected reduction in oil 
output in Western Siberia and the Volga-Ural region, exports in the European 
direction will inevitably fall. If one assumes that in 2020 the likely output 
will reach approximately 50 million tonnes in Eastern Siberian fields 
and around 20–25 million tonnes in Sakhalin, this will mean an increase 
in Asia’s share in total exports by approximately 28–30% (assuming that 
their level will be similar to the present one of around 250 million tonnes 
annually)103. this share may even exceed a third of russian exports if the 
total export level at that time is lower than now. 
Over the past few years, Russian government representatives have on many 
occasions threatened that Russia may “direct its oil pipelines to Asia” and re-
duce supplies to European markets104. However, it would be impossible to fulfil 
such declarations. Europe will still be the most important outlet for rus-
sian oil in the future, although its share will fall to around two thirds of 
total exports. It is also likely that less Russian oil than now will be sent in the 
European direction in a few years. This however will not be a consequence of 
political decisions but of the natural processes of production decline in the oil 
fields which have been the raw material base for Russian exports over the past 
few decades. Despite the expected reduction of exports to European countries, 
Russia is developing its transport infrastructure in the western direction, one 
proof of which is the BPS-2 oil pipeline currently under construction. Thus, by 
opening a new export oil pipeline to Asia and expanding its export capacity 
in the European direction, Russia is creating greater opportunities for its oil 
policy. 
WOJCIECH KONOńCZUK
103 Oil from this region of Russia can however also be transported to the west coast of the USA. 
104 See, for example, the article by the Russian Minister of Energy in the Financial Times, 
19 October 2007.
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